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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE CHAIN STORE TAX BASED
ON TOTAL NUMBER OF STORES
A LOUISIANA Act of 1934 imposes upon each store operated within the state
by a chain store company, a license tax that is graduated according to the total
number of stores held under common ownership both within and without the
state.' Thus chain store companies are classified according to the total number
of stores they respectively operate everywhere, and are then taxed for their
stores in Louisiana at the rate applicable to the classifications in which they fall
by virtue of the aggregate number of stores they operate everywhere, the tax
ranging from ten dollars per store operated within the state by a chain cor-
1. La. Acts 1934, No. 51. Section 1 of the act reads: " . . . because of the advantag-
accruing from the operation of multiple stores wherever situated, and becamuse of the basic
differences inherent in such character of operations there . . . is hereby levied an annual
license tax . . . upon each firm, partnership, or association of persons engaged in the
business of operating, or maintaining, as part of a group or chain, any store or stores in
this state, where goods, wares, merchandise, or commodities of every description whatever
are sold or offered for sale at retail under the same general management, supervision,
ownership or control, commonly known as branch or chain stores.' Section 3 provides:
"that the license tax for such business . . . levied upon the store or stores operated in the
state of Louisiana shall be based on the number of stores . . . included under the same
general management, supervision, ownership or control, whether operated in this state
or not."
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posed of less than ten stores, to five hundred fifty dollars for each store in
Louisiana operated by a chain organization of over five hundred stores.2
Tax measures discriminating against chain stores are extant in sixteen
states, other than Louisiana.3 In general, 4 such statutes are of two kinds:
graduated gross sales taxes,5 and graduated license taxes.0 Under the first, the
2. Total Stores Tax on Total Stores Tax on
Operated by Louisiana Operated by Louisiana
Bracket Company Units Bracket Company Units
1 Less than 10 $10 per store 9 176 to 200 stores $200 per store
2 10 to 35 stores $15 per store 10 201 to 225 stores $250 per store
3 36 to 50 stores $20 per store 11 226 to 250 stores $300 per store
4 51 to 75 stores $23 per store 12 251 to 275 stores $350 per store
5 76 to 100 stores $30 per store 13 276 to 300 stores $400 per store
6 101 to 125 stores $50 per store 14 301 to 400 stores $450 per store
7 126 to 150 stores $100 per store 15 401 to 500 stores $500 per store
8 151 to 175 stores $150 per store 16 over 500 stores $550 per store
3. Ala. Acts 1931, No. 369; Fla. Laws 1933, c. 16071; Idaho Laws 1933, c, 113; Ind.
Acts 1929, c. 207, as amended by Acts 1933, c. 271; Ky. Special Session Acts 1934, c. 26;
Me. Laws 1933, c. 260; Md. Laws 1933, c. 542; Mich. Acts 1933, No. 265; Minn. Laws,
1933, c. 213; Mont. Laws 1933, c. 155; N. M. Spec. Sess. Laws 1934, c. 33; N. C. Laws
1933, c. 445, § 162; S. C. Acts 1930, No. 829; Vt. Laws 1933, c. 46; Wis, Laws 1933, c. 469;
W. Va. Acts 1933, c. 36.
A Georgia statute, Ga. Laws 1927, No. 398, § 109, providing for a tax of $250 for each
store over five operated under common ownership, was replaced by another [GA. CoDE ANx.
(Michie, Supp. 1930) § 993 (280) 1 which levied a tax of $50 per store on each firm owning
a chain of over five stores. The latter act was declared unconstitutional in F. W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 179, 156 S. E. 904 (1931). The present Maryland act
displaces another [Md. Laws 1927, c. 554, § § 1-31 which prohibited the operation of more
than five stores by any owner within one county in addition to a $500 license fee upon
each of the stores of a chain of five or less, held unconstitutional in a lower Maryland
court, Keystone Stores Corp. v. Huster, decided April 21, 1928, by Circuit Court of
Alleghany County (unreported). The present North Carolina act stands in place of N. C.
Laws 1927, c. 80 § 162, which was held unconstitutional in Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co. v. Doughton, 196 N. C. 145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928). The present South Carolina
Act displaces S. C. Acts 1928, No. 574, § 24, which was held unconstitutional in Southern
Grocery Stores Inc. v. W. G. Query, decided by the Court of Common Pleas (unreported).
Many more statutes have been proposed in the state legislatures. Thus in 1930, 13 bills
were introduced; in 1931, 175 bills; in 1932, 125 bills; in 1933, 225 bills; and during 1934,
up to October 15, there had been SO bills introduced. See NicHors, CHAIN SToREs AND
ThEm SPECIAL TAX PRoBLEs (1934) 19.
4. A mild form of discrimination against chain stores may be found in statutes of a few
states taxing the distribution of goods from warehouses of a chain to its stores at a rate
corresponding to that imposed upon wholesalers. See TEN. CODE ANm. (Williams, 1934)
§ 1248.66; VA. TAx CODE (Michie, 1930) § 188. The Virginia statute was upheld in Com-
monwealth v. Bibee Grocery Co., 153 Va. 935, 151 S. E. 293 (1930); and again in Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Morrissett, 58 F. (2d) 991 (E. D. Va. 1931), affd, 284
U. S. 584 (1932).
5. The present statutes of Minnesota, New Mexico, and Vermont are of the graduated
gross sales type, supra note 3. The Kentucky graduated gross sales act, Ky. Acts 1930,
c. 149, has been displaced by a graduated license tax, supra note 3. The repealed Kentucky
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percentage of tax is scaled upwards according to the increase in the gross sales
of the concern; the discrimination against chain stores resulting from the fact
that the sales of all stores of a chain within a state are aggregated, thereby
bringing them within the upper brackets of the tax.7 By the second, the license
fees are graduated acco>ig to the number of stores under a common ownership
within the state, thus discriminating against the chain by reason of its larger
number of merchandising outlets in the state. The passage of this anti-chain
act had been upheld in Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 7 F. Supp. 438 (W. D. Ky. 1933);
Moore v. State Board of Charities and Corrections, 239 Ky. 729, 40 S. W. (2d) 349 (1931).
See 1 Nysmoix, Ecoxomcs oF RLWrAMIw (1930) 265. In order to point the discrimination
involved in the graduated gross sales tax against chain stores, it has been proposed [Ohio
H. B. No. 340 (1929), reported in 1 Op. Att'y Gen. of Ohio (1929) 395] that while & fy-
ing stores according to their gross sales, the tax within each class be increased as the numbar
of stores owned by the taxpayer within the state increases. This was done by two South
Carolina municipalities. Charleston, License Ordinance 1934; Spartanburg, License Tax
Ordinance 1933. The latter was upheld in Great Atlantic and Pacific v. Spartanburg, S. C.,
Sup. Ct., July 20, 1934. That the graduated gross sales tax in its usual form may be more
widely adopted in the future see HAIG AND SnouP, THE SAr.rs Twx n. =ZH Am x uz
STATES (1934) 25. A variant of the graduated gross sales tax is found in the MWiconsin
statute, supra note 3, which levies a tax upon the gross income of every person or company
operating chain stores within the state, that is graduated from 6/20 of 1, of the gross
income of $100,000 or less to 1 3/20% on the excess of gross income over $5', 00,ozo.
See Hardy, Legal and Economic Aspects of Chain Store Taxation in Wisconsin (1934)
9 Wis. L. R v. 382.
6. The statutes of Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and WLst Virginia, supra note 3,
are graduated license tax statutes. That type of statute has been upheld in State Board
of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931), reveruing Jacks'on v.
State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana, 38 F. (2d) 652 (S. D. Ind. 1930); Liggett
v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, U. S. L. Wee%,
Jan. 15, 1935, at 442, reversing Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. Fox, 6 F. Supp. 494 (S. D.
W. Va. 1934); Southern Grocery Stores Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 55 F. (2d)
931 (E. D. S. C. 1932); J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 32 P. (2d) 784 (Idaho, 1934).
For a discussion of the problem of gasoline service stations as chain stores see (1934) 43
Y=nE L. J. 1022; Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, supra.
7. The chain store organization is not only subject to discrimination in favor of the
independent dealer by reason of the graduation of the tax, but since chains often taLe a
smaller profit on a more rapid turnover than the independent retailer, their gross sales
are accordingly larger in proportion to their net income than are those of the indepndent
retailer. That chains operate on a small profit and rapid turnover, see HArwnD A,.D IWmr
Cnnnx STOREs (1922) 8, 136. See FED. TADn Coaxar., PRIcEs Am MAaonRs oF CMWr AND
lDPENDrr Dr=muToRs, Dnraorr-DuG (1934) Doc. No. 96, at 8-22; FED. Tnanz
Com., PRcas AND MAGINS Or CHAWn A.ND INDEPENDENT DIsTRmTroas, Cin.-.;ATI-DTI-u(1934) Doc. No. 95, at 5-17; FED. TaADE Comr, PRices ANA rans or CM u Am,
INDEPENDENT Dxsmanuaoas CxcsINNATi-GRocERY (1933) Doc. No. 88, at 5-18; Fan. Tnsnz
Comm., PRIcES AND MAUGms oF CHAu- AND INDerND= Drsmmuions, ME2aPmS-DnUG
(1934), Doc. No. 97, at 5-14; FED. TAnDE Comms., PICES ,AD MsAn;s OF CHmmn Am)
INDEPNDNT DmrmraOas, WAsr iNrox, D. C.-DRuo (1934) Doc. No. 98, at 6-16. This
factor together with the fact that there may be substantial exemptions would also impart
a more or less discriminatory character to flat rate sales taxes.
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legislation has, with judicial sanction, been intended primarily to aid the inde-
pendent retailer in his competitve struggle aganst chain stores.8 Of the chains,
the larger ones have been the particular object of attack in such legislation.0
This latter fact is indicated, in the first place, by the stack arguments advanced
against chain organizations to the effect that they fail to support local banks,
do not purchase from local sources, and threaten to gain a virtual monopoly
of the retail business of the country.10 If these arguments are accepted, they
would have greatest application to the larger and more widely dispersed chain
store organizations. Secondly, the fact that gross sales and license tax statutes
are scaled upwards with the proportionate increase in rates being much greater
in the higher brackets than in the lower brackets, indicates a definite intention
to discriminate more particularly against the larger chains in the state. Pre-
sumably this has been due to the feeling that the larger the chain, the greater
is the competitive advantage enjoyed over the independent retailer.
While the Louisiana statute parallels these statutes in discriminating par-
ticularly against larger chain groups in the state in favor of independent re-
tailers, it embraces as well the further purpose of protecting and enhancing the
competitive position of the smaller chains indigenous to Louisiana as against the
local branches of the larger sectionally or nationally organized chains by im-
posing heavier burdens upon the latter. This is graphically illustrated by the
reduction in the tax burden to be sustained by local chain store concerns,"' and
8. While denominated tax measures, the production of revenue has in the past been dis-
tinctly subordinate to the purpose of favoring the independent retailer against chain stores
in such statutes. Cf. Becker and Hess, The Chain Store License Tax, and the Fourteenth
Amendment (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 113, 122; Legis. (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rav. 456; Legb,
(1931) 80 U. or PA. L. REv. 289; Legis. (1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 145, 152; Comment (1931) 40
Y=s~a L. J. 431; Sherrill, Chain Taxes Hamper Distributive Eficiency (Jan. 1934) 22
ADVERTISING AND SELLING 21. Of late, however, the necessity of tapping new and additional
sources of revenue in order to meet budget deficits has been ascribed as another important
reason for the passage of recent tax statutes discriminating against chain stores. Cf. NICUOLS,
op. cit. supra note 3 at 11-14.
9. Cf. HOADLEY, THE CHAEN STORE WITH SPEcAL REFERExcE To IOWA (1930) 32;
Mowry, The Menace of Anti-Chain Legislation (July 1933) 21 ADvvaTISwO AND SriL-
ING 24.
10. See Caslow, Why We Are Fighting the Chains (May 1930) 15 ADvERTIsIN ANO
SELLING 22; CnaAsLEr, THE CaAm STORE MOVEMENT Ir CANADA (1932) 32-57; Murphy,
How the Small Bank Can Deal with Chain Stores (1928) 21 Aman. BANKER'S Ass'n
JoURNAL 466; Ernst and Hartl, Chains Versus Independents (Nov. 1930) 131 NATIox 511,
The arguments that have been advanced against chain stores are usually stated only for
purposes of refutation. See NicuoLs, CHAn SToRE MANUAL (1932) 61-85; Surnwm,
A DEBATE HANDBOOK oN CHAIN STORES AND THE ULTIMATE CONSUMER (1930) 45-52,
121-139; BuEHLER, CHAIN STORE DEBATE MANUAL (1931) 39-58; SomEIWv.LE, CAIt=
STORE DEBATE MANUAL (1930) 31-48; Flynn, Chain Stores: Menace or Promise (April,
May 1931) 66 NEw REPUBrC 223, 270, 298, 324, 350. For the consideration of particular
charges commonly levelled against chain stores see e.g. Lyons, Are the Chains the £nemies
of the Manufacturer (May 1930) 18 NATioN's BusINEss 24; Lyons, The Chain Store Side
(Sept. 1929) 22 AmE. BANxER's Ass'N JoURNAL 229; Dovell, Chains Can be Good
Citizens (June 1931) 19 NATION'S BusINEss 78.
11. Those local persons or concerns operating two stores within the state, of which
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the concomitant increase in that to be borne by sectional and national chain
store companies under the new statute, as compared with the displaced act of
1932.12 Under the previous graduated license tax statute of Louisiana and those
of other states,6 the national and the local chain operating the same number of
stores respectively within a particular state have been taxed at the same rate,
without consideration of the possible superior ability of the former to absorb
the tax by reason of operating nationally as well as locally. 3 Thus such a
tax might place the local chain operator at a competitive disadvantage, since,
theoretically, the national chain can spread a tax imposed upon its local units
over its many stores, local as well as national, thereby reducing to a negligible
amount the tax expense to each of its local units. Or it can allow its local units
to absorb the tax themselves, the resultant decrease in profits theoretically being
recoverable by the company's charging higher prices for commodities in stores
there were 295 in 1930, and those operating three stores, of which there were 41 in 1930,
[15th Cmsus of U. S. (1930) 1 DnSmBUno.v 950] will have their tax expenses. pr store
reduced from $15 per store under the displaced act of 1932 (La., Acts 1932, No. 19) to $10
per store under the new act. Strictly speaking those persons or concerns operating two or
three stores are "multi-unit independents" rather than local chains. The latter are thoze
concerns operating 4 or more stores. See NicHoLs, op. rit. supra note 10, at 10. In 1930
there were 23 local chain concerns, each operating over 4 stores, together operating 374
stores in Louisiana; an average of about 16 stores per chain [15 Cra.sus of U. S. (1930)
1 Dis=BUTIoN 950]. Assuming that this represents the usual number of stores owned
by each local chain, the tax expense to each of those local chains for all of their stores
will be reduced from $375 under the act of 1932 to $240 under the present act.
12. The following chart, based upon one prepared by the Limited Price Variety Stores
Ass'n, indicates the operation upon the sectional and national chains of the new act as
compared with the old one.
Total Stores in Louidana Louisana 510
Company Stores Louiana Taxes in 1933 Taxes in 1934 Increase
A 207 107 $14,200.00 $26,750.00 83.3
B 15,500 100 12,800.00 55,000.00 329.6
C 159 4 60.00 600.00 900.
D 153 3 45.00 450.00 M00.
E 230 5 75.00 I,500.0 1,900.
F 667 15 350.00 8,250.00 2,257.
G 1,950 12 260.00 6,600.00 2,438.
H 489 7 125.00 3,500.00 2,700.
I 1,464 8 150.00 4,400.00 2,833.
J 380 3 45.00 1,350.00 2,900.
K 551 7 125.00 3,850.00 2,978.
L 769 6 100.00 3,300.00 3,200.
M 417 2 30.00 1,000.00 3,233.
N 457 5 75.00 2,500.00 3,233.3
0 500 3 45.00 1,650.00 3,566.
Total 23,893 287 $28,485.00 $120,700.00 323.o
13. Cf. FEn. ThDE COM., CIIAN SToRE PRIcE PoLIcIEs (1934) Doc. No. 85, at 104-
118 (local price cutting advantages of larger and more widely distributed chains). No
statistical survey, however, has as yet been made showing the effect of anti-chain taxes upon
the differently sized chains.
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located in other territories where the competition is not so intense. The effect
of the tax would in such case be to leave the local chain store concern with a
choice of two discouraging alternatives: first, to shift the tax to the consumer,
with a probable resultant loss of business to his large chain competitors; second,
to absorb the tax with the effect of reduced net income. The new Louisiana
act materially prevents the possibility of such a disadvantage. In fact it would
seem to create the greater possibility of giving to local chains a positive advant-
age in comparative tax burdens. 1
2
In the policy of effecting a discrimination against sectional and national
chains in favor of local chains, the Louisiana act is preceded only by a Florida
act of 193 1.14 The latter statute sought to accomplish that end by means of a
graduated license tax, which was increased in rate where the taxpayer operated
stores in more than one county. Thus while five stores of a chain operated in
one county were taxed at a rate of ten dollars each, the same number of stores
operated in two or more counties were taxed at fifteen dollars per store. Be-
cause of conditions peculiar to Florida, this statute did, in the main, result in a
discrimination in favor of local chains as against sectional and national
chains. 15 While the United States Supreme Court held this basis of classifica-
tion void as violative of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion,16 it did so upon the ground that the classification on the basis of counties
was wholly arbitrary since it would not necessarily effect a discrimination in
favor of local as against sectional and national chains; a national chain might
confine its operations within Florida to one county and thus be taxed at a
lower rate than a local chain which might operate in two or more counties.
This was apart from the question upon which the court was non-committal,
namely, whether a classification discriminating in favor of local as against
sectional and national chains would be valid.17
But in that case, as previously,' 8 the Supreme Court held that a classification
14. Fla. Laws 1931, c. 15624. Only the Louisiana and Florida statutes have enacted the
policy of discrimination against large national and sectional chains, and in favor of smaller
local chains. But cf. U. S. Daily, Feb. 19, 1930, at 3546, col. 3 (proposed Texas law¢
to excuse local chains from the operation of a graduated license tax); Miss. H. B. No. 235
(1927), reported in CHA3a STORE AGE (Groc. Ed. Dec. 1928) 57 (tax only on those chain
organizations operating in three or more cities in the state) ; S. C. H. B. No. 1200 (1930),
reported in U. S. Daily, Feb. 14, 1930, at 3494, col. 5 (tax only on foreign chains based
on their gross receipts from South Carolina business).
15. See dissent of Cardozo, J., in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. $17, 581 (1933); (1933) 81
U. (X" PA. L. REv. 871, 872; (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 288.
16. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933). The case has been widely commented upon,
Cf, (1933) 19 VA. L. REV. 722; (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 871; (1933) 33 COL. L. Ray.
754; (1933) 7 ST. JOHN's L. Ray. 350.
17. Yet from the care exercised by the court to point out that the Florida act did not
accomplish a classification of national, sectional and local chains, the inference is deducible
that such a classification would be regarded as valid. Liggett v. Lee, 283 U. S. 517, 534-
535 (1932); cf. (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 722, 728.
18. State Board of Tax Comm'rs of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931). Cf. Legis.
(1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 145; Legis. (1931) 44 HAiv. L. REv. 456; Legis. (1931) 80 U. or PA.
L. REv. 289; Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 431.
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according to the number of stores under common ownership within the same
state is "reasonable" under the equal protection clause. The Louisiana statute
departs from the field of chain store legislation already held permissible, by
classifying chain stores for purposes of taxation according to the number of
stores operated everywhere, and thus raises novel constitutional questions.
The first problem is whether the basis of classification adopted in the Louisiana
act results in a denial of the equal protection of the laws to chain concerns
operating stores in other states besides Louisiana. The next is whether the act
deprives those concerns of their property without due process of law either by
the enormity of the tax or by, in effect, taxing their out-of-state stores.
In validating classifications based upon common ownership of stores within
the state, the Supreme Court was impressed by differences in organization and
methods of doing business between independent retailers on the one hand and
chain stores on the other,19 as well as by relatively equal differences between a
chain operating a greater number of units within the state, and another operat-
ing fewer units therein.2 0 An attack upon the Louisiana statute under the equal
protection clause, however, may be predicated upon the fact that by considering
the number of stores of a chain operated everywhere the act favors one chain
over another although both operate the same number of stores within the state.
Past decisions of the court are not determinative of the question involved herein
of whether possession of additional merchandising outlets in other states imparts
to each of the local units of a national or sectional chain such a competitive
advantage over the same number of units of a local chain as to justify a tax dis-
crimination in favor of the local chain's units and against each of the national
chain's units in the taxing state. If it is "unreasonable" to conclude that such
a competitive advantage does exist in favor of each of the units of the national
chain in the taxing state, it may be argued that the Louisiana tax classification
is "arbitrary."2 1  It would thus be taxing at a higher rate the local stores of
such a chain solely because those local stores are connected with units outside
the state, and not because that connection affords a competitive advantage over
an equal number of units of a local chain.22
19. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931).
The decision was confined to the holding that there existed sufficient differences between
the independent retailer on the one hand, and chain stores on the other, to justify their
separate classification for tax purposes. Nevertheless, it may be said that implicit in the
sustenance of the graduated license tax in that case was the holding that a large chain does
a different type of retailing than a smaller chain, to afford a basis for a difference in
treatment between them.
20. In Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., U. S. L. Week, Jan. 15, 1935, at 444, col. 1,
the court held that a larger chain does a different type of retailing than a smaller one,
thus providing a permissable basis for their separate tax clasdifications.
21. Classification of objects for purposes of different treatment in order to be valid under
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment must rest upon a difference which is
substantial and not trivial, so that all similarly situated will be treated alike; it muzt be
directed to the accomplishment of a purpose within the permissible functions of the state;
and the difference must bear a substantial relation to the object of the legislation. See
Coo=x', TAXAION (4th ed. 1924) § 334 and cases there cited.
22. Every chain possessing stores outside of, as well as within Louiina, is a foreign
1935]
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It may well be demonstrated, however, that local units of a large national
chain possess definite competitive advantages over those of a small local chain,
which afford a proper basis for their separate classification and treatment.
The Supreme.Court has recently20 explicitly enuhciated the proposition, hitherto
implicit in State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson,"' that
differences in numerical size between chain store organizations provide a reason-
able basis for separate tax classification among them. According to the court,
the opportunities and powers of the chains become greater with the increase in
the number of component links thereof, and the resultant disparity in com-
petitive positions and social effect between the numerically larger and smaller
chains furnishes a ground for treating them differently. 25 It would logically
follow from these differences that there would be a corresponding disparity
in the competitive position of the individual units belonging to differently sized
chains; the feature of being an integral part of a larger chain impresses upon the
individual units characteristics which must set them apart from the units of a
smaller chain. 24  While the generalization of the court, that a larger chain
possesses definite advantages over a smaller chain, was made in reference to a
statute which considered only the number of stores within the state, it would be
equally applicable to a situation in which chains had stores both within and
without the state. The advantages accruing from the possession of an increased
number of stores would not cease to operate at state lines. Logically, those
advantages would be more truthfully reflected by consideration of the total
number of stores everywhere operated, rather than of only those stores within
the state. That totality would also appear to be the truer determinant of the
comparative competitive positions of the individual stores belonging to and
therefore partaking of the features of different sized chains. Such differences
corporation. Unlike some state courts [Coo=zv, TAXAvioi (4th ed. 1924) § 359], the
Supreme Court has definitely adopted the rule that once a foreign corporation has been
admitted to do business in a state, the 14th Amendment forbids a discrimination against
foreign corporations in favor of domestic corporations similarly situated. Southern Ry.
Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494
(1926). Hence the sectional and national chains could not be discriminated against solely
because they are foreign corporations.
23. In Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., U. S. L. Week, Jan. 15, 1935, at 444, col, 1,
the Court said, "A chain, as we have seen is a distinctive business species, with its own
capacities and functions. Broadly speaking its opportunities and powers become greater
with the number of component links; and the greater they become, the more far reaching
are the consequences, both social and economic. For that reason the state may tax the
large chains more heavily than the small ones, and upon a graduated basis as indeed we
have already held. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931);
Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933)!'
24. While each unit of a chain is a purely local institution in the sense that Is serves
only a local community [FED. TRADmE Comma., Cmu STORE PICE PoLICIEs (1934) Doe. No.
85, at 1041, the advantages purported to inhere in the chain organization, of which It b a
part, naturally accrue to it. Hence ff a large chain does a different type of retailing than
a smaller chain, or affects the community in a different way, it follows that each unit of a
larger chain is similarly distinguishable from each unit of a smaller chain. Cf. Sams,
(July 1930) CHAMr SToa AGE 22.
[Vol. 44
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existent in the local stores of a larger as compared to those of a smaller chain,
would therefore afford a basis, valid under the equal protection clause,2 for
discriminating in the taxes imposed upon them.
Another justification for validating the act under the equal protection clause
may be that it effects a reasonable classification of national, sectional, and local
chains for purposes of taxation.20 It may be shown that, in general, the greater
the number of stores under a common control, the wider is the geographical
territory served. Thus in 1930, local chain store companies owned an average
of nine stores, sectional chains an average of forty-five, and national chains an
average of one hundred fifty-four.27 This condition seems to be reflected in
Louisiana, as well as in other states.2 8 The greater breadth of geographical dis-
tribution of stores of the larger chains has been adduced to afford definite com-
petitive advantages in the form of an increased bargaining power as against
labor,9 an ability to take advantage of price dislocations between different ter-
25. Admittedly, the differences in methods of retailing between the units of a larger
chain and those of a smaller chain may not be great. However, they would hardly be any
less than the differences between each unit of a chain and an independent retailer who is
a member of a cooperative retailing association. See Brief for Appellants 122-185; Ligtt
v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933). And, in Liggett v. Lee, the Supreme Court held that chain
stores might be treated differently than independents who were members of cooperative
organizations. Indeed, as a rule, differences between objects separately classfed need not
be great in order to be valid under the equal protection clause. Cf. American Sugar Refin-
ing Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912);
Toyota v. Territory of Hawaii, 226 IU. S. 184 (1912); Bradley v. City of Richmond, 227
U. S. 477 (1913); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 (1914); Tanner v-
Little, 240 U. S. 369 (1916); Armour and Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1 (191S); Ft. Smith
Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532 (1920); White River Lumber Co. v. Ark a,
279 U. S. 692 (1929); State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S.
527, 538 (1931).
26. The classification of chain store companies into national, sectional, and loea chains
was adopted in 15th CEsus or U. S., RrzAm DsmmuTiozr, RnTMrLr Cisaws (1930). A
chain is national if the stores comprising it are operated throughout the country; it is
sectional if it operates stores in a number of communities in certain sections of the country;
it is local if substantially all of its stores are located in one community. Id. at 7; Xicnos,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 9.
27. In 1930, 5,589 local chains operated 52,465 stores; 1,136 section chains operated
51,058 stores, and 321 national chains operated 51,058 stores. 15th Cre;sus or U. S., op. cit.
supra note 26, at 11; NrcOLs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 12.
28. 15th CExsus oF U. S., op. cit. supra note 11, at 950.
29. While statistics accumulated by the Federal Trade Commeeon, if valid would tend
to indicate that chain stores pay lower wages to their employees than independent retailers
[Fa. TRADE Co=., AeNwuA. REroRT (1933) 351, they do not con-ider the comparative
wages paid by national, sectional, and local chains. Information gathered in the Ceaus of
Distribution (15th Cr-rsus or U. S., op. cit. supra note 26, at 31) indicates that the wages
paid by local as against sectional and national chains in the grocery business were about the
same that the local chains paid somewhat higher wages than sectional chains in the meat
market business, and that local chains paid higher wages than national and sectional chaim
in the combination grocery and meat business. These figures, however, are obviously
inconclusive. But consider the incident of the recent A. & P. strike in Cleveland (see N. Y.
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ritories for selling and purchasing purposes, as well as to shift losses sustained in
one territory to a more inelastic consuming market in another3 0 These pur-
ported advantages, a fortiori, would accrue to the benefit of each unit of the
chain, so that each unit of a national chain conducts a business in a different
manner from each unit of a sectional and local chain, and each unit of a sec-
tional chain in a different manner from each unit of a local chain.24 Such dif-
ferences would afford a reasonable basis for the tax discrimination under the
Louisiana statute. The possibility is ever present, however, that a local chain
may possess as many stores as a sectional or national organization, and there-
fore may be taxed at the same rate. This possibility, remote though it may be
from actuality, may, as in the Florida case,' 6 upset the validity of the means
adopted to achieve the classification between national, sectional, and local chains.
Still, the numerical basis seems the closest approximation of the national, sec-
tional and local chain classification yet devised. The existence of remote potential
exceptions to the general classification would hardly justify vitiating it.31
Nevertheless, it might further be objected under the equal protection clause
that the difference in rate of taxation of local units of a national chain as com-
pared with the units of a local chain made possible by the consideration of
outside stores in fixing the rate under the Louisiana statute, is not related to the
actual degree of difference in the value of the privilege enjoyed by the units
of each of those types of chains. 3 2 Thus, admitting that there are differences
between a chain store belonging to a local chain of 10 stores and another belong-
ing to a national chain of 500 stores, but possessing only 10 stores within the
state, which would justify some difference in treatment between them, it may
be argued that those differences can not be so great as to justify a tax of but
$10 upon the former and $550 upon the latter. This argument however, would
assume that the equal protection clause requires not only that the differences
between objects separately classified be substantial, but also that the taxes be
proportioned to the differences in the value of the privilege enjoyed by tax-
Times, Oct. 31, 1934, at .1, col. 5) wherein that company was able, by reason of Its vast
national organization, to threaten seriously to withdraw its 300 stores from that dty. For
an elaborate discussion of the social significance of the huge corporation as compared with
smaller concerns see dissent of Brandeis, J., in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 564-568 (1933).
30. See note 13, supra. The purported advantages outlined in the text are only those which
can result from the operation of stores over a wide territory. To these advantages might be
added those resulting from the operation of a greater number of units than the smaller local
chain, such as greater capital, greater purchasing power, superior management resulting
from the employment of specialists in the supervisory activities and large scale advertising.
See note 23, supra.
31. Even though it be held that the Act does not result in a proper classification of
national, sectional, and local chains, the act might still be upheld as resulting in a classifica-
tion according to the numerical size of chain store concerns. See note 23, supra.
32. The Federal District Court in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Fox, 6 F. Supp.
494, 807 (S. D. W. Va. 1934), stated: " . . . a classification of different chains may be
subject to condemnation if the difference between them has no relation to the privilege
enjoyed." Finding that the difference between commodity and gasoline chains bore no
relation to the privilege enjoyed, the court held invalid the West Virginia statute involved
there.
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payers. While a dictum of the United States Supreme Court may lend support
to the view that the tax exacted must bear some relation to the value of the
privilege for which it is imposed,as that court has not as yet definitely read the
requirement contended for into the equal protection clause. Indeed, decisions
of the court seem to suggest that once a classification is reasonable, it will not
consider whether the treatment given different classes accords with the actual
differences in privileges enjoyed by them.P4 This appears especially true in cases
where the tax classification also had a public welfare purpose.as Thus in a
recent decision involving a Washington statute which levied an excise tax of 150
a pound on all butter substitutes and no tax upon butter, the court having
found that there were differences between butter and oleomargarine which
justified their separate classification, did not consider whether the differences
were so great as to justify the difference in treatment given thema And still
more recently the Supreme Court has refused to hold that the disparity in the
value of the retail privilege enjoyed between gasoline filling station chains and
independents, or between gasoline filling station chains and commodity chains
rendered a graduated license tax void as .violative of the equal protection
clause2 0 Therefore, it would seem that once there has been shown to be a valid
basis for discrimination between local and national chains, it is not of legal
significance that the tax of $550 on the Louisiana unit of a national chain of
over five hundred stores, as compared with the $10 tax on the unit of the local
chain may not have a substantial relationship to the actual difference in the
value of the privilege enjoyed by one as compared with that enjoyed by the
other.
The maximum rate of $550 imposed by the Louisiana statute upon all stores
within the state which are members of a chain of more than than five hundred
stores is the highest fee to which state37 anti-chain taxes have as yet been
33. In Air Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 83 (1924), the Court said,
'Without holding that the charge must be measured by the value of the privilege for
which it is imposed, it may be said that some relation to such value is a reasonable
requirement . . . "
34. See Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 197 (1893); Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 203 (1905); Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222
U. S. 63, 76 (1911); St. Louis and Southwestern Ry. v. Nattin, 277 U. S. 157, 159 (192);
cf. COOL=Y, TAXATiox (4th ed. 1924) § 261.
35. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 (1901); Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912); Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis, 240 U. S. 342 (1916);
Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369 (1916); Armour and Co. v. Virgifi, 246 U. S. 1 (1913);
Alaska Fish Salting and By Products v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921); A. M agnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934).
36. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934).
37. Municipal ordinances however, have been graduated to even higher levels than the
Louisiana act. Thus a municipal ordinance of the city of Hamtramck, Michigan, imposLd
a license tax upon retail establishments that was graduated to $1,00. This ordinance
was declared unconstitutional as being confiscatory and beyond the power of the munici-
pality in Kroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. City of Hamtramck, No. 200325, Circuit Court,
Wayne County, Mich. (1932) (unreported). A similar ordinance of the City of Maplewood,




graduated. 8  By virtue of this comparatively large fee, the Act is theoretically
chalengeable on the ground that the fee is confiscatory, and therefore violative
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.80 Actual proof of con-
fiscation in the sense of virtual usurpation of profits might, however, be neces-
sary to sustain such an argument.40 But even assuming that the act is con-
fiscatory in operation, if it be found that the classification which is adopted is
valid, it is possible to invoke the caveat that "the power to tax involves the
power to destroy" 41 and so to support the tax despite its effect. Thus, the Su-
preme Court has frequently upheld tax statutes clearly designed to hamper or
destroy particular industries or methods of business deemed to be undesirable
upon the ground that, the power to tax the subject matter being clear, the judi-
ciary will not prescribe limits on the extent to which it may be exerted. 4 2 Yet in
these cases, the Supreme Court has been careful to assert that it reserved the
power in a given instance to strike down such legislation under the due process
clause where the operation of a statute would lead to the inference that the
form of taxation was adopted as a disguise to exercise another power denied to
the state by the federal constitution. 43 There is no indication, however, that the
destruction by a state of chain store type of retailing, deemed by it to be inimical
City of Maplewood, Case No. 98057, Circuit Court of County of St. Louis (1933)
(unreported).
38. At the present time no graduated license tax has a maximum limit as low as that
present in the Indiana statute which was upheld in the Jackson case. The statutes of
Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina have maximum fees of $150 per unit;
Michigan and West Virginia have maximum fees of $250 per unit; and Idaho has a maximum
fee of $500. See note 3, supra. While the Louisiana tax is the highest ever to have been
enacted by a state, even higher chain store taxes have been proposed. Calif. A. B. 1609
(1933); Wash. H. B. 11 (1933) proposals to tax each store of a chain over 20 at $2,500;
for proposals to graduate the tax up to $1,000 per store over a stated number see Ill. H. B.
121 (1933) ; Minn. H. B. 108 (1933) ; N. Y. A. B. 1265 (1933) ; N. Y. Sen. B. 243 (1933) ;
So. Dak. Sen. B. 145 (1933). For a tabulation of anti-chain store tax acts proposed during
1933 see NAiONAL CHAuN SToRE AssocIATioN, TAE CHAMN SToRE TAx PROBL= (1933) 43-52.
39. State courts have often declared municipal license tax ordinances invalid on the
ground that they were confiscatory, and thereby deprived their victims of property without
due process of law. See note 37, supra; City of Monroe v. Endelman, 150 Wis. 621, 626, 138
N. W. 70, 72 (1912); Fiscal Court of Owen County v. Cox Co., 132 Ky, 738, 743, 117
S. W. 296, 298 (1909) ; State v. Osborne, 171 Ia. 678, 695, 154 N. W. 294, 301 (1915).
40. See J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 32 P. (2d) 784, 797 (1934). Of course, tills
requirement is merely that if complainant seeks to rely upon the argument that the tax
is confiscatory, he must prove it: viz., that it would render the continuance of business In
the state unprofitable.
41. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (U. S. 1819). For a discussion of
the implications of the dictum of that case see Levin, Does ithe Power to Tax Involve the
Right to Destroy a Lawful Business? (1933) 67 U. S. L. R-v. 448, 512.
42. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869); McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27
(1904); Alaska Fish Salting and By Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921); A.
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934).
43. See A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 44 (1934); cf. McCray v. United
States, 195 U. S. 27, 60 (1904); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 37-44 (1922); HALL,
CAsEs on CoNsTrrUTiONAL LAw (1926) 659.
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to the public welfare of the state, is a power denied to the state. 4 In fact, by
the latest Supreme Court decision upon chain store taxation the object was
approved "to discourage the multiplication of units of a chain to an extent
believed to be inordinate, and by the incidence of the burden develop other
forms of industry." 45
But, assuming that the purpose and method of discrimination adopted are
otherwise "reasonable," the most serious objection that may be raised against
the Louisiana statute is that inclusion of outside stores in the determination of
the rate at which local stores of a sectional or national chain are to be taxed
thereby operates, in effect, to tax property and business beyond the jurisdiction
of the state. It is elementary that consistently with the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, a state may not tax objects beyond its borders. 0
The Louisiana statute, however, on its face levies a tax upon the privilege of op-
erating stores within Louisiana, a proper subject of taxation,47 and merely takes
outside stores into consideration as a means of computing the sum at which the
privilege is to be taxed. Nominally therefore, it may be said that the Louisiana
act does not tax property and business beyond the jurisdiction of the state.
But that fact is not conclusive of the question whether the act does tax prop-
erty and business beyond the confines of the state. If it can be shown that the
actual effect of the act is to accomplish that result, it might nevertheless be
unconstitutional.4 8 In the determination of this matter, consideration of the
so-called "subject and measure" tax cases is pertinent.
Analytically, in these cases, the "subject" of the tax "is that on which the
statute says the tax is imposed" 49 and has usually been the legal privilege
given to the taxpayer by the state in return for which it exacted a tax;50 the
"measure" is "that element whose magnitude in each particular case, given the
rate of the tax, determines the amount which the taxpayer must pay."'5 Ap-
parently, a primary test of fatal extraterritoriality in excise tax statutesP2
44. Cf. dissent of Brandeis, J., Liggett v. Lee, 283 U. S. 517, 574 (1933).
45. Fox v. Standard Oil Co of N. J., U. S. L. Week, Jan. 15, 1935, at 444, col. 1.
46. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Buck v. Beach, 2C5
U. S. 392, 402 (1907); Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 2S0 U. S. &3
(1929); see CoOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § § 92-100.
47. The power of a state to exact a tax for the privilege of doing business within its
borders is dear. CooL=, TAxATrox (4th ed. 1924) § 829.
48. It is often stated that in determining whether a state tax violates the federal con-
stitution, the court will look at the operation or effect of the tax, and not at its name or
form. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 27 (1910); Sioux Remedy Co. v.
Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 203 (1914); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arllansa, 235 U. S.
350, 362 (1914); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 476 (1932).
49. Lsaacs, The Subject and Measure of Taxation (1926) 26 COL. L. Rr,. 939, 940.
50. The "subject" however, need not be a legal privilege given by the state, it may
also he property, tangible or intangible; persons; or business. Ibid.
51. Ibid. A typical example of a "subject and measure" tax occura where a state levies
a tax upon a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing a local business at 21 of its
total capital stock. The privilege of doing a local business is the "subject," 25 the rate;
and capital stock the "measure."
52. It seems that where the "subject" of the tax is local property of a foreign corpora-
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containing no maximum limitation was, subsequent to 1 9 1 0 ,53 the inclusion of
foreign elements, themselves directly nontaxable, in the "measure" of the tax.54
Thus, where a foreign corporation, doing business and maintaining property in
a number of states, was taxed for the privilege of doing a local business at a
specified rate applied to the total amount of its issued or authorized capital
stock, with no maximum limitation to the tax,", the tax was held invalid as, in
effect, a taxation of property and business without the state.60 The "measure"
tion, there may be included in the "measure" of the tax, elements which are themselves
directly non-taxable. U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 (1912); Cudahy Packing
Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 (1918). Cf. Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Contro.
versies over State Taxation (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REV. 773, 774; Isaacs, supra note 49,
at 949.
53. Previous to 1910, the settled rule was that any tax upon a proper "subject" was
valid even though measured by elements in themselves directly non taxable. The basis
for the rule was that the state, having the power to grant or withhold a particular
privilege, might attach any condition it desired to the exercise of that privilege. See Powell,
Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States
(1918) 31 HARv. L. Rxv. 572, and cases there cited. Subsequent to that date the general
rule was departed from by means of qualifying the previous reason for the rule. Thus
while a state had the power to grant or withold a particular privilege, it might not attach
an "unconstitutional condition" to the grant of such a privilege. See Isaacs, The Federal
Protection of boreign Corporations (1926) 26 CoL. L. Rzv. 263, 273-284.
54. But a franchise tax upon a domestic corporation measured by its total capital stock,
irrespective of the fact that it may do business and possess property in states other than that
of its incorporation, which necessarily includes in the "measure," elements which are directly
non taxable, is now settled to be valid. Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks,
253 U. S. 325 (1920); Nebraska ex rel. Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Marsh, 119 Neb, 197,
227 N. W. 926 (1929), aff'd per curiam 282 U. S. 799 (1931). Similar taxes upon foreign
corporations are uniformly held invalid (infra note 56). This apparent anomaly Is ex-
plainable only upon practical grounds. See Powell, supra note 53 at 610. Since every chain
store concern operating stores without as well as within Louisiana is a foreign corporation,
the rule as to domestic corporations, even were the taxes otherwise analogous, would not
be relevant to the Louisiana Act.
55. Even where the "measure" of a tax upon foreign corporations for the privilege of
doing a local business included elements in themselves directly non-taxable, if a "reason-
able" maximum was fixed to the amount of the tax, that sufficed in a number of cases to
validate the tax. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68 (1913) ; Cheney Bros. Co. v.
Mass., 246 U. S. 147 (1918); General Ry. Signal Co. v. Va., 246 U. S. 500 (1918). See
Powell, supra note 53 at 777, 941 as to the probable reasons for tolerating those statutes.
Whether a maximum provision will render such a tax constitutional at the present time is
doubtful. See Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 218 (1925) ; Cud-
ahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U. S. 460 (1929); cf. Brief for Appellant 13-21, Cudahy Pack-
ing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U. S. 460 (1929); (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 834; (1929) 42 HARV, L.
R-v. 952; (1929) 13 MINN. L. Rav. 609.
56. See Powell, supra note 53, at 572, 721, 932, and cases there discussed; St. Louis South-
western Ry. Co. v. Stratton, 353 Ill. 273, 187 N. E. 498 (1933), cert. denied, 291 U, S.
673 (1934). In these cases, the taxpayer was engaged partly in interstate commerce within
the state, and it was held that the tax not only constituted a burden upon interstate com-
merce but also taxed property of the corporation beyond the jurisdiction of the state.
No case has as yet arisen in which a foreign corporation doing only a local business within
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was in this case the total capital stock of the corporation, and representing, as
it did, all of the corporation's business and property, included fatal extra-
territorial elements. Similarly, where a tax upon the "subject" of the privilege
of transfer of a resident decedent's property was assessed at a predetermined
rate against all of his property within and without the state, such property
being the "measure" of the tax, it was held unconstitutional in Frick. v. Pennsyl-
vania as taxing that property included in the "measure" which was beyond
the jurisdiction of the state. 7  Where, however, the tax upon a foreign corpor-
ation for the privilege of doing local business was imposed at a specified rate
upon the proportion of capital stock allocable to the state re s this "measure,"
representing the property and business within the state, was not extraterritorial
and the tax was therefore valid.59 Since in these cases the rate of the tax to
be applied against the "measure" was either fixed, or graduated only according
to the amount of capital stock of the corporation allocated to the state, the
sole problem of extraterritoriality arose in connection with the inclusion of
foreign elements in the "measure" of the tax.
The Louisiana statute, however, raises the question whether the measure of
the state has been taxed for its local privilege at a certain rate applied to its total capital
stock. Declarations in the opinions however, indicate that in such a case also the tax would
violate the due process clause as taxing extrastate values included in the measure." Sez
Powell, Due Process Tests of State Taxation, 1922-1925 (1926) 74 U. or P' L. Rxv. 423,
446.
57. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 26S U. S. 473 (1925). See Isaacs, supra note 49, at 947. For
a general discussion of state inheritance tax laws raising problems of extraterritoriality, sze
Powell, Extraterrtorial Inheritance Taxation (1920) 20 COL. L. Rxv. 1, 233.
58. A usual method of determining what proportion of capital stock shall be allocated
to the state is to take that percentage of the total capital stock of the corporation, that the
property located and business transacted in the state bears to the total property and busi-
ness of the corporation. Thus:
Property within the state+business transacted in the state X
Total property+total business Total capital stock
59. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350 (1914); Hump Hairpin
Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290 (1922); Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U. S. 88 (1923);
International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429 (1929); Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmer-
son, 281 U. S. 511 (1930); Southern Realty Corp. v. McCallum, 65 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933). But where the "measure" is the proportion of authorissd capital stock: allocable
to the state, the tax is held unconstitutional as being extraterritorial. Air Way Electric Appli-
ance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71 (1924); Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Becker, 69 S. W. (2d)
674 (1934). In some cases, income rather than capital stock is used as the "measure" of
the tax levied for the "subject" of exercising a corporate privilege within the state. Where
the "measure" income, is allocated to the state, the tax is valid. Bass, Ratcliff, and Gretton
Ltd. v. State Tax Comm., 266 U. S. 271 (1924); Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Travis% 274 Fed. 975
(S. D. N. Y. 1921); S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett, 51 F. (2d) 353 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
Should, however, the apportionment result in allotting profits to the state which are not
fairly attributable to transactions therein, it is probable, upon the analogy of the income
tax cases, that the tax would be voided as taxing profits outside the state. Cf. Hans Rees
Son Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931) ; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Thoresen,
29 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Comment (1931) 40 YAE L. J. 1273.
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the tax being confined to the state, the rate to be applied against that measure
could validly be graduated according to the existence of elements located both
within and without the state. There the "subject" is the privilege of doing
chain store business in Louisiana, the "measure," the local stores, 0 and the
rate, a sum determined by the total number of stores. The nearest approach
to a decision on this point is the case of Maxwell v. Bugbee,01 upholding a New
Jersey non-resident decedents' transfer tax statute.0 2  That statute purported
to tax the transfer of local property, but, where the decedent's estate was partly
within and partly without the state, the sum payable was to be determined by
first computing the tax that would be payable if the entire estate were within
the state and then taking the proportion of the amount derived thereby that the
value of the property actually located within the state bore to the value of the
total estate. The tax rate that would be applied to such a transfer of an
entirely local estate was progressively graduated as follows: for the first $5,000,
nothing; for the next $45,000, 1%; for the next $100,000, 1Y2o; for the next
$100,000, 2%; and for all over, 39.03  It would seem that when progressive
percentages are applied to the total property and a proportion of that sum
taken, the foreign property is at least partially introduced into the measure,0 4
To square with the ideal conception of "measure" not including extraterritorial
property, it would have to be said that, in effect, only the "rate" was set by the
total property, as a certain amount, and that the "measure" of local property was
applied to determine the actual magnitude of the tax, not by the usual method
of multiplication, but by division. It is notable in this respect that the subse-
quent case of Frick v. Pennsylvania, in seeking to distinguish the principal case,
interpreted the New Jersey tax in such a way as to make a perfect division
between the "measure" and the "rate".0 5 It nevertheless remains difficult to see
60. The ready determinability of the number of stores in the state obviates any problem
of determination of the "measure."
61. 250 U. S. 525 (1919). See Comment (1920) 33 HARv. L. Ray. 582; (1920) 14 ILL.
L. REv. 661; (1920) 68 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 184; (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 464.
62. N. J. Acts 1914, c. 151, §§ 1, 12.
63. Thus where a non-resident decedent left a total estate of $2,500,000, only $250,000
of which was situated in New Jersey the tax would be $7,145. Had he possessed no
property outside of New Jersey the tax would have been but $3,950.
64. Thus where two non-resident decedents should leave equal amounts of property In
New Jersey and sufficient amounts of outside property to invoke the maximum rate of 3%,
the'fact that they possessed different amounts of outside property would result in a difference
in the tax to be paid upon the transfer of their equal amounts of property within the state.
Had the total property been used solely to determine the rate of tax applicable to the local
property, since both total estates would come within the 3% limit, the taxes would have
been equal. In absence of this equality, the conclusion is inescapable that the New Jersey
statute does at least partially introduce foreign property into the "measure" of the tax.
65. 268 U. S. 473, 496 (1925); "The only bearing which the property without the state
had on the tax imposed in respect of the property within was that it affected the rate of the
tax. Thus, if the entire estate had a value which put it within the class for which the
rate was three percent, the rate was to be applied to the value of the property within the
state in computing the tax on its transfer although its value separately taken would put it
within the class for which the rate was two per cent." In this respect, the court appears to
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that the magnitude of the tax actually was not as much determined by the total
property as the local property, or in any event, that a "rate" which is in part
determined by the existence of extraterritorial property does not to that extent
accomplish a tax upon that property. 60 That the existence of foreign property
thus used in fixing the amount of the tax resulted in an increase in the tax
required of the taxpayer, however, failed to convince the bare majority of the
Supreme Court that the statute "really" effected a tax upon foreign propertyFc
The Frick case subsequently declared Max-wcll v. Bugbee to be a borderline
case and apparently limited it to its particular facts. But in so doing it defined
those facts to be the express use of foreign elements in the determination of
the rate of tax to be applied to a local measure.6s If the Maxell case, together
with the distinguishing rationalization of it in the Frick case, can fairly be said
to stand for the general proposition that a tax is not extraterritorial merely
because it determines the rate to be applied to the local measure by considering
extraterritorial elements, direct precedent is available for upholding the
Louisiana statute.
But the intrinsic weight to be given the Maxwell case is rendered questionable
not only by its dubious logic but also by reason of the fact that the New
Jersey statute, there upheld, is distinguishable in operation from the Louisiana
statute. Thus in the former statute, wherein the extraterritorial elements
figured in both the "measure" and the "rate," the finding of non-extrater-
ritoriality may be rationalized by the fact that a proportion of the total sum
have misconstrued the New Jersey statute involved in the Maxwell case. The rates w.ere
progressively graduated; they did not relate back to cover previous assifications as the
court in the Frick case assumed, but were applicable only to such property as fell within
the bracket which induced the higher rate. Applying the progressive graduated rate of the
New Jersey statute to a local estate of $250,000 which was part of a total estate of
$2,500,000, the resultant tax would have been $7,145. But had the statute been as the court
in the Frick case interpreted it to be, the total estate, being over R300,000, would have
fallen in a class to which a flat rate of 3% would have been applicable to the local estate.
This would have resulted in a tax for the transfer of the $250,000 of local property of
$7,500. The latter situation of course, would be directly analogous to the Louisiana tax,
for it merely determines the rate by the total number of stores, and then applies that rate
against the local stores to arrive at the amount of the tax return.
66. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525s, 543 (1919),
said: "Many things that a legislature may do if it does them with no ulterior purpose,
it cannot do as a means to reach what is beyond its constitutional power... New Jersey
cannot tax the property of Hill or McDonald outside the state, and cannot use her power
over property within it to accomplish by indirection what she cannot do directly. It se-ems
to me that that is what she is trying to do... It seems to me that when property outside
the state is taken into account for the purpose of increasing the tax upon property within
it, the property outside is taxed in effect, no matter what form of words may be used."
67. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 539 (1919): "In the present case the state im-
poses a privilege tax, dearly within its authority, and it has adopted as a measure of that
tax the proportion which the specified local property bears to the entire estate of the
decedent. That it may do so within limitations which do not really make the tax one upon
property beyond its jurisdiction, the decisions to which we have referred dearly estabishy"
68. See also possible argument set forth in note 71 infra.
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derived from a consideration of those elements was allocated to the property
within the state. But in the latter statute, the extraterritorial elements are
determinative only of the "rate," and no apportionment of the resultant in-
creased sum is made beyond the fact that it is imposed upon each of the local
stores. The clarity with which the stark issue of extraterritoriality is here
presented is emphasized by the sharp upward curve of the "rate" in relation to
total stores, the result of which is frequently to determine the greater portion
of the tax return by the existence of the foreign stores. 9 Thus, a national
chain owning fifteen stores in Louisiana and five hundred and thirty-five stores
elsewhere, by reason of the method of rate adjustment adopted in relation to
the local stores, would find itself taxed $8,250. Had it no foreign stores the
tax would have been $225. In this manner 97.27% of the tax return is deter-
mined by the existence of foreign stores. Similar percentages are reflected in
many of the national and sectional chains operating in Louisiana.70 Especially
in the light of the actual gross disproportion of taxes upon the Louisiana units
of sectional and national chains, resulting from the existence of their foreign
stores, it may strongly be urged that the statute effects an unconstitutional
taxation of those stores.7 1
But the success of such a demonstration is by no means assured. The result
in the Maxwell case and the occurrence of logical anomalies in others of the
"subject and measure" tax cases 72 indicate that in deciding whether a particular
69. Both the Maxwell and Frick cases affirmed the principle that, consistently with due
process, a state may not impose a tax on a local privilege in such a way as really to amount
to taxing that which is beyond its authority. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 540
(1919); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 496 (1925). If this has any meaning, it
would seem that actual proof in any given instance of extraterritorial allocation of the
tax cannot be precluded.
It may be found that the tax, computed upon the basis of foreign as well as local stores,
where the number of foreign stores so far exceeds the number of local stores as to be de-
terminative of the classification of the chain under the Louisiana act, can have no relation
to the value of the privilege enjoyed by members of the national chain in Louisiana. Hence,
the amount of tax above that which would be a reasonable exaction for the privilege con-
ferred, must of necessity be imposed upon foreign stores. The statute could therefore be
declared unconstitutional as taxing extraterritorial elements. Cf. Airway Electric Appliance
Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 83 (1924); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Stratton, 353 111.
273, 187 N. E. 498 (1923), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 673 (1934).
70. Under the table set forth in note 12, supra, it may be noted for example that Co.
A would have 80% of its tax return determined by the existence of its foreign stores; Co.
C, 90%; Co. D, 98.18%; Co. E, 96.66%; Co. P, 98.28%; Co. N, 98%.
71. Yet the dialectic may be indulged that the rate is not determined by the total
number of stores, but rather by the character of business done by the local stores, a
purely local matter; and the total number of stores is used as but a convenient determinant
of that character. So the increase in taxes is due not to the existence of foreign stores
but to the existence of a different mode of business in the local stores, that mode being
apprehended by consideration of the totality of stores. Realistically, however, it is dif-
ficult to see that the rate is not directly, or in substantial effect, determined by the total
number of stores.
72. It is anomalous that while a tax upon a foreign corporation for the privilege of
doing a local business measured by its total capital stock, where it does busine. in a
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tax is extraterritorial, the Supreme Court frequently considers something more
than the empirical effect upon the taxpayer or the weight of inconclusive pre-
cedent.73 In this connection, the fact cannot be overlooked that the Louisiana
Act does represent an endeavor to promote the local welfare of the state by
strengthening the competitive positions of the local and smaller chains in
Louisiana as against the larger organizations operating stores there, and by
discouraging the latter. The past decisions of the Supreme Court, approving
chain store taxes, have settled the validity of the state purpose to preserve
local welfare by use of tax discrimination designed to adjust the competitive
positions of the various independent and chain store units doing business within
the state. Logically, that sanction would seem to carry over to effective dis-
crimination based upon the size of the parent chain.7 4 The reasonableness of
the tax classification to accomplish this purpose is likewise indicated.75 The
inference that the precedent of Mamwell v. Bugbce is invocable to deny the
extraterritoriality and uphold the constitutionality of the statute would then
appear to be inevitable.j 6
number of states, is unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, a simila tax upon a domestic corporation, likewise doing business in a num-
ber of states, is constitutional. See note 54, supra. Furthermore, if a tax upon a proper
"subject" which is measured by elements directly taxable, is actually a tax upon the ele-
ments within the measure, it is anomalous that a tax for the privilege of doing a local
business measured by net income which includes non taxable income from a federal
instrumentality, is constitutional Educational Films Corp. of America v. Ward, 232 U.
S. 379 (1931); Pacific Co., Ltd. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480 (1932). Cf. Powell, An Im-
aginary Judicial Opinion (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 889.
73. Cf. Lowndes, Spurious Conceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation (1934)
47 HARv. L. RLv. 62S, 639; Powell, supra note 53, at 610.
74. See supra p. 626. 75. See supra p. 626.
76. The possibility is open, however, that national and sectional chains may escape the
rigors of the Louisiana tax by reincorporating their local units into -eparate subidiary
corporations. A similar device was used subsequent to Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920), to effect a reduction in state income taxes imposed upon
foreign corporations conducting business in a particular state, in connection with their
business in other states. See (1927) 27 Cor. L. Rxv. 753; (1931) 31 CoT. L. R-v. 719.
As a rule, if a parent corporation does not directly intervene in the affairs of its sub-
sidiary, but permits it a good deal of autonomy, the parent company is usually held not to
be "doing business" within the state for purposes of service [Peterson v. Chicago, Rock
Island and Pacific Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 364 (1907); Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Paching
Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925)] or taxation [Proctor and Gamble Co. v. Newton, 289 Fed. 1013 (S.
D. N. Y. 1923) ]. See Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1925)
14 CAta . L. R.v. 12. That rule would appear to be applicable in this instance where the tax
is upon such firms as do business in the state. If local units of a national chain are in-
corporated into a separate local corporation, only the latter would "be engaged in operating
... as a part of a... chain any store ... in the state," and only the stores in the state
may then be used for purposes of tax classification. But the Louisiana legislature might
readily amend its present act so as to consider, regardless of corporate organization, the
local units of the subsidiary as part of the national chain, if such in reality it is, and
classify it accordingly. Many graduated license tax statutes at present have provisions
disregarding corporate forms. See e.g. Ala. Acts 1931, No. 369, § 7; Fla. Laws 1933, c.
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The question of extraterritoriality of this statute can hardly be considered in
vacuo; it is inextricably bound up with the larger purpose of the act and the
necessary method of its achievement. 77  In the absence of compelling case pre-
cedent it would appear, therefore, that to hold the tax extraterritorial would
necessarily be to deny the legitimacy of the state's purpose to protect domestic
welfare by using the tax power to affect the intra-state competitive positions
of multi-state chains operating there. The halt that this would represent in
the logical extension of the policies and principles already enunciated by the
Supreme Court7" would require a dual assumption. The first is that protection
of large sectional and national chains from discriminatory state taxation 0 is
vital to the national economic welfare. And the second is that the enhancement
of such welfare, thereby to be achieved, is more important to the national public
interest than the freedom of individual states to provide for what they conceive
to be their domestic welfare. These assumptions remain yet to be proved,
In absence of such proof there appears scant reason to remove the question of
public concern with the treatment of national and sectional chains in a particular
state from the exclusive province of that state.80
16071, § 7; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 113, § 7; Me. Laws 1933, c. 260, § 6. And statute3 dis-
regarding corporate forms set up to evade local income taxes, have been passed and upheld
as a proper means of allotting to the state its just portion of the corporation's Income.
Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 F. (2d) 2216 (W. D. Wis. 1930); Buick Motor Co. v. City
of Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d) 385 (E. D. Wis. 1930); cf. People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v.
Gilchrist, 244 N. Y. 114, 155 N. E. 68 (1926). See Magill, Allocation of Income by Cor-
porate Contract (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 935; Comment (1932) 32 Co.. L. Rav. 513.
77. It is difficult indeed to perceive how the competitive equalization sought between
the stores of the various chain organizations doing business in the state can effectively be
accomplished otherwise than by such tax discrimination.
78. See supra p. 626.
79. In this respect the vast possibilities opened up for municipalities to Impose dis-
criminatory taxes on one or more stores of longer chains situated in their jurisdictions, can-
not be overlooked. As to municipal chain store taxes already enacted see NATIONAL CHAN
STOaE AssOciATON, THE Can STORE TAx PROBLIZI (1933) 19-30; NIcnOLS, CHAIN STORES
ANp THE SPEciAL TAX PROBLM.rS (1934) 35-47.
80. The question of extraterritoriality does, however, present the opportunity for the
Supreme Court to reconsider its previous refusals to review the local wisdom or policy in
taxing chains, without the necessity of formally finding the action of the state legislature
arbitrary and capricious. Thus an independent judicial policy, recognizing the economic
utility and desirability of large chain organizations, could indirectly be given effect to pre-
vent possible destruction or excessive restriction of such organizations, by the device of
finding a fatal extraterritoriality in the Louisiana tax. Such a result, however, would appear
to await a change in the climate of opinion now prevalent in the Supreme Court.
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ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AS COLLATERAL SECURITY
FREQUENTLY a merchant who needs additional credit for his business opera-
tions has no unincumbered asset that can be used as security except his ac-
counts receivable-that is, debts owed to him for goods sold to customers.
Such an asset may have a fairly constant value, and be of a highly liquid
nature, where in the course of business new accounts are created as existing
ones are paid. Yet the economic and legal aspects of a transaction wherein a
loan is made and the lender is given a lien against this asset that will be effec-
tive to protect him from the claims of other creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy
are such as to make this type of financing unsafe and expensive.'
Generally the transaction, to be successful, must be made with the greatest
possible secrecy.2 Obtaining credit on the security of book accounts is fre-
quently a measure of last resort to continue a business that has exhausted all
other sources of credit.3 The high interest rates and other charges paid to lend-
ers that specialize in this type of finance indicate that the credit risk is great. 4
Knowledge that a business has been forced to resort to this practice would raise
the suspicions of the general creditors, to the detriment of the business. Where
the business is insolvent, bankruptcy might result if the creditors feel that the
lien against the accounts can thus be destroyed, or that the business will even-
tually fail. Thus, if it is discovered that this type of transaction has occurred,
the result may be ruinous.3
1. The assignment of book accounts has become increasingly popular in the last few
years. They may be utilized not only to secure credit, but may be sold outright. Sometime
a complete transfer of the accounts is made and the assignee is permitted to collect them.
This is not the general practice in a business of large proportions. See Hanna, The Exten-
sion of Public Recordation (1931) 31 COL. L. Rrzv. 617. The name given to the agreement
does not determine its legal incidents. Whether the transaction be called a sale, pledge,
assignment or mortgage, the court will examine its actual nature and rule accordingly. Chap-
man v. Hunt, 254 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Petition of National Discount Co, 272 Fed.
570 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921); Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 115, 8 N. E. 392 (18S6); Preston v.
Southwick, 115 N. Y. 139, 21 N. E. 1031 (1889).
2. Recordation, which is required in the case of chattel mortgages, is not necessary Ward
v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 232 Fed. 119 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916); In re Letcrman,
Becher and Co. Inc., 260 Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); In re Leslie-Judge Co, 272 Fed. 836
(C. C. A. 2d, 1921); In re Macauley, 158 Fed. 322, 327 (E. D. Mich. 1g07); Booth v.
Kehoe, 71 N. Y. 341 (1877). Secrecy has itself never been thought sufficient grounds for
avoiding an assignment, nor need the debtor be informed. See Greey v. Dockendorf, 231
U. S. 513, 516 (1913) ; Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925) ; In re Hawley Down-Draft
Co., 238 Fed. 122 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Robertson v. Henochsberg, 1 F. (2d) 624 (W. D.
Tenn. 1924); Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N. Y. SOS, 522 (1882).
3. Such transactions are generally managed by finance companies because they have the
necessary facilities and are willing to bother with its manifold details. Lauchheimeri Sonne
Problems in Modern Collateral Banking (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 129, 130.
4. The relationship is obviously a reciprocal one. The cost incidental t o such financing
is the reason why it is used only when absolutely essential to continue busines. See Hanna,
supra note 1.
5. The description given herein is discussed in greater detail by Hanna, supra note 1.
Secrecy and the cost of collection are the reasons why the obligor is not informed and the
assignor is himself permitted to collect. For an interesting description of this type of fnanc-
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The legal side of the problem is complicated by the fact that, although
economically the accounts may be considered as a unit of more or less constant
value, they are a group of constantly changing choses in action, each one of
which has a separate legal significance. Whereas in a few jurisdictions it is
legally permissible to create a "floating charge," by assigning at one time all
present and future accounts as collateral, that will be valid against third per-
sons," in many others such an assignment would be ineffective because of the
rule against the transfer of after-acquired property.7 Under the old common
law, ownership is identified with the idea of physical possession; therefore
one cannot transfer that which he does not own or that which does not exist.8
According to this view future accounts have been held by some courts to rep-
resent no existing legal interest and hence to be unassignable at law. Other
courts have treated the question somewhat differently, but in such a manner
that the exact effect of such an assignment is not yet clear. Following the
English rule' ° that is based on the maxim that equity considers done that
ing and the methods used to keep them secret see McGill v. Commercial Credit Co., 243
Fed. 637, 640-645 (D. Md. 1917); Lauchheimer, supra note 3, says the succesm of such
hypothecations depends completely on their secrecy.
6. The assignor may use for his own benefit the funds he collects. Union Trust Co. v.
Bultdey, 150 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); In re MacCauley, 158 Fed. 322 (E. D. Mich.
1907); Preston National Bank of Detroit v. George T. Middlings Purifier Co., 84 MIch, 364,
47 N. W. 502 (1890); Buvinger v. Evening Union Printing Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 321, 65 Atl.
482 (1907). In order to avoid a possible ground for successful objection, it is advisable to
assign all accounts or some specific accounts, since the courts require that there be some desig-
nation. In re Imperial Textile Co., 255 Fed. 199 (N. D. N. Y. 1919); Tailby v, Official
Receiver, 13 App. Cas. 523 (1888). Although a written agreement is desirable, and has been
thought necessary, oral assignments of accounts have been upheld. Union Trust Co. v.
Bulkley, 150 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); In re Macauley, 158 Fed. 322 (E. D. Mich.
1907); see Lichtenberg v. Harvey, 57 F. (2d) 82, 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
7. The problem discussed herein is to be distinguished from the assignment of an account
under an existing executory contract or an expectancy. For the latter problem see In re
Duncan Construction Co., 280 Fed. 205 (S. D. W. Va. 1922); United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Armstrong and Bro., 225 Ala. 276, 142 So. 576 (1932); Claycraft Co. v.
John Bowen Co., 191 N. E. 403 (Mass. 1934); Huling, Brockerhoff and Co. v. Cabell, 9
W. Va. 522, 526, 527 (1876).
8. Low v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347 (1871); Taylor v. Barton Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117
N. E. 43 (1917); (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 272; See Comment (1924) 34 YA=n L. J. 175, 176.
The common law rule in regard to the importance of physical transfer in gifts and realty
perhaps explains why some courts say that a subsequent physical transfer of an account
will create good legal title in the assignee, as is noted infra.
9. Clanton Bank v. Robinson, 195 Ala. 194, 70 So. 270 (1915), and cases cited therein;
Ellis v. Sabine County Coal Co., 199 Ill. App. 219 (1916); In re Nelson's Estate, 211 Iowa
168, 233 N. W. 115 (1930) ; Eagan v. Luby, 133 Mass. 543 (1882) ; Lehigh Valley Rr. Co. v.
Woodring, 116 Pa. 513, 9 Atl. 58 (1887); Huling, Brockerhoff and Co. v. Cabell, 9 W. Va.
522 (1876) ; O'Neil v. Helmke, 124 Wis. 234, 102 N. W. 573 (1905).
10. The leading English case dealing with chattel mortgages is Holroyd v. Marshall, 10
H. L. Cas. 191 (1862). It was applied to accounts receivable in Tailby v. Official Receiver,
13 App. Cas. 523 (1888). This doctrine is generally referred to as the English rule, and wag
first suggested in the United States in 1843 in Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9673p
p. 527 (C. C. D. Me. 1843).
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which ought to be done, they have held that as soon as an assigned account
comes into existence it is subject to a lien in favor of the assignee as against
the assignor.11 But it is not certain that all courts that have accepted this
reasoning will apply it to make the assignment of future accounts good against
third persons. In the analogous case of chattel mortgages at least one juris-
diction that has held the assignment of after-acquired property good as between
the parties has also held that it creates no rights against creditors.' 2 Thus,
11. Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 533, 102 Pac. 956 (1909); Edwards v. Peterson, 80 Me.
367, 14 Atl. 936 (1888); Field v. Mayor of New York, 6 N. Y. 179 (1S54); Coats v. Don-
nell, 94 N. Y. 168, 177 (1883) ; cf. Bank of Oaknan v. Union Coal Co., 15 F. (2d) 3G0 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1926) ; Coppard v. Martin, 15 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. Sth, 1926) ; see note 6, supra.
The right is thought to be a personal claim against the assignor which matures into a lien
when the property is acquired.
Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U. S. 513 (1913), is generally cited as authority for the right
to assign after-acquired accounts. The facts however are much more limited in scope, and
the language of the court does not warrant the statement. Cf. National City Bank v.
Hotchkiss, 231 U. S. 50 (1913); Mechanics' Bank v. Ernst, 231 U. S. 60 (1913); Irving
Trust Co. v. Bank of America National Association, 68 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
In analyzing the decisions of the courts in the past, it is particularly important to distin.
guish the cases before and after 1910 when the Bankruptcy Act was amended. Prior to that
date the trustee only stood in the position of the bankrupt, and a lien against the bankrupt
would be good against the trustee. At present, the trustee has the right of a creditor hold-
ing a legal or equitable possessory interest in the property of the debtor, so that the lien of
the assignee must not only be good against the assignor but good also against third pcrons
in order to escape the court of bankruptcy. See York Manufacturing Co. v. Ca-sell, 201
U. S. 344 (1906); Hayes v. Gibson, 279 Fed. 312 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); Godr.n v. Miurchi.
son National Bank, 145 N. C. 320, 59 S. E. 154 (1907).
The fact that the account accrues after involvency is known and within four months ot
bankruptcy does not create a preference if the original agreement was valid. Godwin v.
Murchison National Bank, 145 N. C. 320, 59 S. E. 154 (1907); Coats v. Donnell 94 N. Y.
168, 178 (1885); cf. Coppard v. Martin, 15 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) (and caszs
cited therein).
Consideration must be given at the time of the original assignment; otherwise there is a
completely executory contract which is not effective. The theory is that equity acts
in such cases in a manner similar to that of specific performance. Where, however, there is
no consideration, there can be no specific performance since there is no element of irrepara-
ble damage. In re Cotton Manufacturers' Sales Co., 209 Fed. 629 (E. D. Pa., 1913).
Contracts assigning, in praesenti, rights to arise in the future are to be distinguished from
contracts to assign in the future. If the agreement be the latter, a transfer within four
months of bankruptcy when insolvency is known has been held a preference. In re Great
Western Manufacturing Co., 152 Fed. 123 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907); Hayes v. Gibson, 279 Fed.
812 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922). Whether courts in these cases are merely interpreting siril
types of contracts in different ways, no attempt has been made to determine.
12. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894); BfacDonnel
Buffalo Loan and Safe Deposit Co., 193 N. Y. 92, 85 N. E. 801 (1903); Titus,lle Iron Co.
v. City of New York, 207 N. Y. 203, 100 N. E. 806 (1912); cf. O'Neil v. Helme, 124 Wis.
234, 102 N. W. 573 (1905); see Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. Brooklyn
Rapid Transit Co., 263 Fed. 532 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920). It has been suggested that New York
will enforce an assignment of future accounts as against third persons, but there is no direct
authority for the proposition. See Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New Yorh (1920)
20 Co. L. R.v. 519, 531.
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although an assignment of future accounts is valid in such jurisdictions, it may
not be an adequate protection for the assignee.
In spite of this restriction on the freedom of assignment, the desired result
may be reached. A loan may be made upon the security of present accounts.
'Ihen, when all or part of the accounts have been paid, a new loan may be
made for other collateral, or the merchant may substitute and assign new
accounts for the sums collected and retained, which is in effect the same
thing l35  The only difficulty still to be avoided when either method is used
arises out of the application of the Bankruptcy Act. If new accounts are as-
signed within four months of bankruptcy and after insolvency is known to the
assignee, the collateral must coincide in amount and time with the new loan;
14
for example, if the collateral is assigned after the new loan has been made,
the assignment might be considered as given for an antecedent debt and there-
fore a voidable preference.10 These legal barriers are, however, weakened, by
the fact that seizure or transfer of "possession", after an account previously
assigned has been created, has been held to establish good title against all credi-
tors who have not meanwhile established a lien against the property.10  Even in
A mortgage on after-acquired chattels is good against purchasers with or without notice
in New York. See Irving Trust Co. v. Bank of America National Association, 68 F. (2d)
887, 889 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Diana Paper Co. v. Wheeler-Green Electric Co., 228 App.
Div. 577, 240 N. Y. Supp. 108 (4th Dep't, 1930). For the New York rule in regard to pub-
lic utilities see Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Buffalo Gas Co., 280 Fed. 830 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
For the law in regard to day loans to brokers see Irving Trust Co. v. Bank of America
National Association, 68 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
Whether a creditor must be a lien creditor before he can attack a transfer, invalid In any
way, is not clearly settled. For a discussion of this problem see GLEmx, Tur LAW 0
FRAunuErNra CONvEYANcES (1931) §§ 75-89.
13. The validity of substitutions after insolvency is known is well established, regard-
less of what law exists as to after-acquired property or fraudulent conveyances. Clark v.
Iselin, 21 Wall. 360 U. S. (1874); Sawyer v. Turpin, 91 U. S. 114 (1875); In re Reese-
Hammond Fire Brick Co., 181 Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910).
14. The rule of bankruptcy is particularly effective in such transactions where the
assignor acts as the agent of the assignee, since the assignor's knowledge has been imputed
to the assignee. In re Cotton Manufacturers' Sales Co., 209 Fed. 629 (E. D. Pa. 1913).
15. Wolfe v. Bank of Anderson, 238 Fed. 243 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916); In re Lambert and
Braceland Co., 29 F. (2d) 758 (E. D. Pa. 1928); cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Bank of America
National Association, 68 F.. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). The Bankruptcy Act requires
the presence of all three factors, insolvency, knowledge of transferee, and diminution of the
estate in order to create a preference. Pirle v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438
(1901); Farmers' Bank of Edgefield v. Carr and Co., 127 Fed. 690 (C. C. A. 4th, 1904);
Federal Finance Corp.,v. Reed, 296 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924); In re Herman, 207 Fed. 594
(N. D. Iowa 1913); Robertson v. Henochsberg, 1 F. (2d) 604 (W. D. Tenn. 1924).
16. The idea of using seizure or possession in regard to accounts, as is done in the case
of chattels, seems somewhat strained since seizure connotes some element of tangibility. See
In re Macauley, 158 Fed. 322, 327 (E. D. Mich. 1907); In re Borok, 50 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931); Note (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rav. 279, 280. Delivery of accounts was accomplished
in In re Hub Carpet Co., 282 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom,
Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925), by transfer of a list of accounts. See also Savage
Tire Co. v. Stuart, 61 Mont. 524, 203 Pac. 364 (1922). But cf. Clanton Bank v. Robinson,
195 Ala. 194, 70 So. 270 (1915) (delivery of list of accounts does not constitute a pledge).
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some of those states that do not accept the theory of equitable lien, the efficacy of
prior possession has been carried further, perhaps illogically, to relate the transfer
of possession back to the date of the original assignment, thereby not only
avoiding the claim of other creditors, but also preventing the trustee in bank-
ruptcy from claiming that a preference was given. 17
The cumbrous method of financing necessary to circumvent the rule against
the assignment of future accounts has, of course, features that are objection-
able to the parties, and that perhaps serve a restrictive function. The lender
must be constantly on his guard since the prior existence of a lien creditor
will make seizure ineffective.' 8  This adds expense, for the finance company
may deem it necessary to employ a representative to observe the assignor's busi-
ness and to determine when seizure appears necessary. Moreover, the amount
of collateral given when the loan is made cannot be easily increased. Unless a
new loan is made that would raise the assignor's total investment, an increase in
collateral might bring into play the bankruptcy rule against preferences1
Even more important, the finance companies and banks which engage in such
secret financing are faced with a high degree of legal uncertainty due to the
incomplete status of the law in most jurisdictions. Any prediction must be
largely based on analogy from the decisions of courts in regard to mortgages
of after-acquired chattels.2 0  Although the identity of the tw-o classes is sup-
ported by the trend of some courts,-" others may not consider such analogy
It is not clear what the position of the Supreme Court was in the case of Benedict v. Rat-
ner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925). In the light of the cases cited by the Court it cannot be said
that the Court thought the assignment to that extent good. The most effective method of
taking complete possession would be to notify the debtors. In re Robert Jenkins Corp., 17 F.
(2d) 555 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927). Possession may be taken over the objection of the ass-,nor.
Cf. Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U. S. 91 (1905). The New York rule in regard to chattel
mortgages is that seizure is of no effect. Skilton v. Coddington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 79D
(1906); Zartman v. First National Bank of Waterloo, 189 N. Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907).
17. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905); Fisher v. Zollinger, 149 Fed. 54 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1906); In re Robert Jenkins Corp., 17 F. (2d) 555 (1927); Chase v. Denny, 130
Mass. 566 (1881). A similar rule is followed in regard to recordation immediately prior to
bankruptcy. See Martin v. Commercial National Bank, 245 U. S. 516 (1918).
18. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905). The trustee has the right of a credi-
tor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings as of the time a petition in bankruptcy
is filed. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268 (1915); General Securities Co. Inc.
v. Dricoll, 271 Fed. 295 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921). Seizure, if it is to be at all effective, must
occur prior to the filing of the petition. Fairbanks Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U. S. 642 (1915).
However if the trustee also represents a prior lien creditor, he assumes all the privileges they
would have. Note (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 279.
19. In re Mandel, 127 Fed. 863 (S. D. N. Y. 1903); In re Dismal Swamp Contracting
Co., 135 Fed. 415 (D. Va. 1905).
20. Most jurisdictions do not appear to have decided either this issue or the subsequent
question of fraudulent conveyances. Both points of view in regard to these issues have been
upheld by eminent authority.
21. Union Trust Co. v. Bulkley, 150 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); Taylor v. Barton
Child Co., 128 Mass. 126, 117 N. E. 43 (1917). In the case of fraudulent conveyances dis-
cussed i fra, the federal courts have come to identify chattel mortgages and the assignment of
accounts, employing the same rules for both.
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conclusive, and a court should find practically no difficulty in most jurisdic-
tions in making the law as it will.
A second and more serious limitation on the law of assignment has appeared
in recent years.2 Until 1925 it was thought to be the general rule that an
assignment of accounts could be valid regardless of the disposition to be made
of the proceeds. 23 In that year the Supreme Court sharply reversed this current
belief in the decision of Benedict v. Ratner,24 which settled the law for all fed-
eral courts in the absence of controlling state opinion.25 The doctrine there
stated in regard to assignments had never been previously expressed,20 although
it was perhaps implicit in previous decisions of some state courts when dealing
with the same problem in the analogous cases of chattel mortgages. 7 In that
decision, Mr. Justice Brandeis, either because of economic ideals or obedience
to past learning, and perhaps both, affirmed the materialistic philosophy found
in the common law theory of ownership which associates the legal right with
physical possession,28 and held that not only an agreement but also a sufficient
22. The remarkable number of cases in which assignments, obviously drawn by expcrl-
enced counsel, have been held bad bears witness to this fact. Note two recent decisions,
City National Bank of Beaumont v. Zorn, 68 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Irving Trust
Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 185 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
23. Cf. In re Michigan Furniture Co., 249 Fed. 978 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); In re Hub Car-
pet Co., 282 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), rev'd, sub nom. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353
(1925); see GLENN, op. cit. supra note 12, § 203. Contra: Radford Grocery Co, v. Haynle,
261 Fed. 349 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919). A contrary view, based on a doubtful application of the
doctrine of "ostensible ownership," prevailed as to chattel mortgages in many jurisdic-
tions. Means v. Dowd, 128 U. S. 273 (1888); see Einstein's Sons v. Shouse, 24 Fla. 490, 499,
500, 5 So. 380, 384 (1888); Edelhoff and Rinke v. Horner-Miller Mfg. Co., 86 Md. 595, 612,
613, 39 Atl. 314, 317 (1898). To the effect that such an application of the doctrine of osten-
sible ownership was not completely justifiable see Brown v. Leo, 12 F. (2d) 30, 351 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1926) (applies rule of Benedict v. Ratner to chattel mortgages).
24. 268 U. S. 353 (1925). The Court found it necessary to decide on the basis of gen-
eral jurisprudence since it did not consider a lower New York court decision of Stackhouso
v. Holden, 66 App. Div. 423, 73 N. Y. Supp. 203 (4th Dep't, 1901), of sufficient weight to
control its decision. It is stated in Irving Trust Co. v. Finance Service Co., 63 F. (2d) 694,
695 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) that the New York Court of Appeals was to have decided the issuo
for itself in Foreman v. Louis Jacques Construction Co., 235 App. Div. 494, 257 N. Y. Supp.
45 (2d Dep't, 1932). The case does not seem to have come up.
25. The Court noted in the instant case, as the Supreme Court has before, that the
decisions of state courts control in regard to the validity of an assignment. Hiscock v.
Varick Bank of New York, 206 U. S. 28 (1907).
26. This view is urged by GLENN, op. cit., supra note 12 § 204. Although the court cited
New York decisions in regard to chattel mortgages, it is not certain that it thought the
analogy controlling. But see note 27, infra.
27. In a Comment (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 175, one year prior to the Court's decisIon a
view similar to that adopted by the Court is suggested as then existing, and is criticized. See
also In re Stiger, 202 Fed. 791 (D. N. J. 1913); Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 213, 218 (1893);
New York Security and Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas and Light Co., 159 N. Y, 137, 53 N. E.
758 (1899); Stackhouse v. Holden, 66 App. Div. 423, 73 N. Y. Supp. 203 (4th Dep't 1901)
(dissenting opinion).
28. The doctrine rests upon a "supposed conceptual repugnancy between the mortgage
and the reserved power, quite regardless of any evils which may result from their coupling."
Brown v. Leo, 12 F. (2d) 350, 351 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
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change of dominion was necessary for the transfer of an interest in property.
Thus, it was held that in order to create a good assignment it is not enough
for the assignor to make an instrument of assignment; it is also necessary that
some immediate control over the accounts be actually transferred from bor-
rower to lender. Since that decision the courts that are bound by it have sought
to mark out the elements constituting sufficient dominion in order to deter-
mine what transfers are fraudulent in law because of "unfettered dominion"
reserved in the transferor.-
The exact nature of the restriction as it has been subsequently interpreted
by the courts is not certain, although its outlines may be indicated. From the
language and the holdings of the cases, and the general practise of finance com-
panies, it seems that in order to make a valid transfer certain formal requisites
must be met. 0 For the sake of certainty, specific accounts should be assigned
and marked on the books for the assignor,31 and a copy of these accounts must
be delivered to the assignee,3 2 although no court has held an assignment void
or voidable solely because either was left undone.a The borrower, if requested
to collect the accounts assigned without notifying the obligors of such an assign-
ment, may act in the capacity of agent for the lender if all the funds he
receives are immediately applied in payment of the debt secured,3 or deposited
in a separate account for the benefit of the assigneeas and an accounting
rendered. The due date of any assigned accounts may not be extended without
the express permission of the assignee. Some courts have upheld the validity
of an assignment though some of the funds were used by the assignor for his
own benefit, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the lender;30 but the trend
29. It seems, by the language of the Court, that it was impressed by the possible fraudu-
lent effects of such an assignment, although the gravamen of the decision is otherwise.
For the application of Benedit v. Rathzer to the assignment of stock exchange seats, see
In re M. J. Hoey Co. 19 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
30. The discussion here deals solely with the question of validity in regard to third pzr-
sons. For the distinction between rights of prior and subsequent creditors, and a trustee in
bankruptcy, see In re Joseph, 43 F. (2d) 252 (Ml. D. N. C. 1930).
31. Note the procedure in Young v. Upson, 115 Fed. 192 (S. D. N. Y. 1902); In re
Almond-Jones Co., 13 F. (2d) 152 (D. Md. 1926).
32. See In re Monumental Shoe Manufacturing Co., 14 F. (2d) 549 (D. Did. 1926); R. C.
Poage M,illing Co. v. Economy Fuel Co., 128 S. W. 311 (Ky. 1910).
33. In re Boggs-Rice Co. Inc., 4 F. Supp. 431 (W. D. Va. 1933); see Queen City Print-
ing Ink Co. v. Rochester Herald Co., 38 F. (2d) 254 (W. D. N. Y. 1930).
34. It has never been doubted that the assignor may collect the funds himself for the
benefit of the assignee. Clark v. Iselin, 21 Wall. 360 (U. S. 1874); In re Leterman, Becher
and Co., Inc., 260 Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
35. Radford Grocery Co. v. Haynie, 261 Fed. 349 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); Irving Trust
Co. v. Finance Service Co., 63 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); In re Almond-Jones Co,
13 F. (2d) 152 (D. Md. 926); cf. McCluer v. Heim Overly Realty Co., 71 F. (2d) 100 (C.
C. A. Sth, 1934). Parker v. Meyer, 37 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) is contrary but
should not be taken as authority in the second circuit in the absence of state law. In regard
to the situation where the assignee is also the depository bank, see In re Monumental Shoe
Mfg. Co., 14 F. (2d) 549 (D. Md. 1926).
36. Chapman v. Emerson, 8 F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925); cf, Coppard v. Martin,
15 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926). The authority of In re Dulberg, 60 F. (2d) 601 (E. D.
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of authority is directly contrary. If the assignor is allowed the use of these
funds until the due date of the loan, the assignment has been held to be no
assignment at all.37 Moreover, the requisite dominion will not be satisfied
merely by a stipulation in the assignment agreement that the assignee has the
right to demand or seize funds collected by the borrower before default.38
These limitations affect not only the agreement drawn by attorneys, but also
the actual relationship determined from the practice of the parties. Recent
decisions have demonstrated, perhaps because such conveyances are disfavored,
that a properly drawn agreement will not of itself adequately protect the as-
signee against the borrower's creditors3 9 Evidence may be introduced to show
the intent of the parties or their actual understanding at any particular time.40
If it is found that the terms of the agreement have in effect been varied so
that the existing relation is fraudulent according to the standards previously
stated, all subsequent assignments will be held avoidable and the assets col-
lected will be subject to the rights of creditors.4 If the debtor and creditor
renew the loan periodically, assign new collateral, and reassign the old, the
entire security, old as well as new, may be invalidated by subsequent conduct.
Under some earlier decisions 42 the courts have considered a reasonably express
agreement necessary to vary the terms of the first contract. 4 3 But one court has
more recently in effect held the failure to prohibit any incidental deviation
from the agreed terms which is brought to the notice of the assignee, and which
would make the transfer fraudulent, suffices to indicate a new agreement.41
Following this tendency a court may even say that, regardless of actual knowl-
edge, under particular circumstances the lender should reasonably have ex-
N. Y. 1932) is doubtful. Moreover, that case involved a summary proceeding, in which
the courts act differently. In re Paramount Fireproof Door Co. Inc., 43 F. (2d) 588 (E, D.
N. Y. 1930). When the money collected is used by the assignee without the acquiescence of
the lender, the assignment remains valid. McCluer v. Heim Overly Realty Co., 71 F. (2d)
100 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
37. City National Bank of Beaumont v. Zorn, 68 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); In
re Almond-Jones Co., 13 F. (2d) 152 (D. Md. 1926); In re Edelstein, 18 F. (2d) 963 (S. D.
N. Y. 1926); Irving Trust Co. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 185, 191 (S. D.
N. Y. 1934).
38. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925); In re Almond-Jones Co. 13 F. (2d) 152
(D. Md. 1926). In jurisdictions having no decisions in regard to accounts, it would seem
advisable to rely on the state law of chattel mortgages.
39. Very often the assignee carefully observes and controls the assignor's business. Shifts
in their relationship are therefore likely to occur without the knowledge or consent of counsel.
40. In re Edelstein, 18 F. (2d) 963 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); Potts v. Hart, 99 N. Y. 168, 1
N. E. 605 (1885); Freeman v. Rawson, 5 Ohio St. 1. (1855).
41. Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); In re Lambert
and Braceland Co., 29 F. (2d) 758 (E. D. Pa. 1928).
42. See particularly Chapman v. Emerson, 8 F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
43. Brown v. Leo, 12 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Spaulding v. Keyes, 125 N. Y.
113, 26 N. E. 15 (1890); cf. Frost v. Warren, 42 N. Y. 204 (1870); Brackett v. Harvey, 91
N. Y. 214 (1883).
44. Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); cf, Walradt
v. Miller, 45 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). A different view is found in In re Hanover
Milling Co., 31 F. (2d) 442 (D. Minn. 1929).
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pected that the assignor would use the collected funds for his own benefit, and
if he has in fact done so, the assignment is invalid.u Therefore, the assignee
must, for his own protection, take active steps to enforce strict compliance with
the details of the agreement. 40
The grounds on which the courts are willing to find that the original agree-
ment has been changed and a new and fraudulent conveyance created, have in
fact resulted in another formal requirement for the validity of a transfer. Some-
times the goods sold to create the account are returned to the borrower after
the account has been assigned. If the assignee who has provided for the con-
veyance of such goods to himself appears to acquiesce to the assignor's use of
such goods for his own benefit, by merely remaining silent after he should have
known of the matter, the agreement of the parties will be held to have been
varied.47 And since it is a well established rule in many jurisdictions that the
assertion of unfettered dominion by the assignor as to any part of the security
taints the entire transfer, the agreement will be declared fraudulent.'9 The
assignee must, then, in order fully to protect himself against such a contin-
gency, not only provide in the contract, but actually demand that all goods be
turned over to him or require the assignor to set aside the returns for his bene-
fit. 49 If the amount of the returns is large, and the assignee wishes to protect
them or the proceeds of their sale against creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy,
he must also observe various rules in regard to chattel mortgages in general,
and the state statutory requirements of recordation. 0
45. Such an argument might prove particularly effective if there were also a chattel
mortgage, and the business constituted the assignor's sole source of support. Note the situ-
ation facing the court in Walradt v. Miller, 45 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
46. It might be that if the assignee made no attempt to find out what the assignor was
doing, but rested on his agreement, that under certain circumstances he would not be held
ot have acquiesced to a new agreement. However, since a certain amount of control i3
always taken for the sake of protection, it will generally suffice to permit the court to find
that the assignee knew of the acts of the aignor. Strict control is therefore desirable.
47. Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co. 54 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). Different views
are held by courts in regard to the dominion that must be asserted by a mortgagee in the
case of a chattel mortgage. See for eample: Robinson v. Elliot, 21 Wall. 513 (U. S. 1374);
Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266 (1891); Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U. S. 545
(1910); In re Marine Construction and Dry Dock Co., 144 Fed. 649 (C. C. A. 2d, 1N05).
48. In re Leslie-judge Co., 272 Fed. 886 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921; Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y.
115, 8 N. E. 392 (1886); Hangen v. Hachmeister, 114 N. Y. 566, 21 N. E. 1046 (1889);
Skilton v. Coddington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 790 (1906). But cf. In re Hanover Milling
Co. 31 F. (2d) 442 (D. IAfinn. 1929).
49. This provision is only noted to indicate how the avoidance of an entire assignment
may be prevented. The substitution of accounts for the chattels when sold in the ab-ence
of recordation introduces again the question of rights of third persons and preferences in
bankruptcy. See In re Bernard and Katz, Inc., 38 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 2d., 1930). Whether
failure to take notice of returns in the contract of assignments will make the conveyance
fraudulent is not very clear. See In re Vanity Fair Slippers, 4 F. Supp. 83 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
It is most advisable that such returns be segregated, since failure to do so, might be grounds
for arguing that in fact there never was an assignment.
50. Goldstein v. Rusch, 54 F. (2d) 86 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); Failure to record Will not




Although compliance with the doctrine set forth in Benedict v. Ratner
would seem to require repayment of the loan as soon as the assigned accounts
were collected, and hence to prevent the borrower from retaining the money in
his business, such is not in fact the case. Here, as under the rule against the
assignment of future accounts, it is possible to finance a business over an in-
definite period of time on the security of accounts receivable. One method that
might be followed is to allow the assignor to use the money collected to purchase
new stock subject to a chattel mortgage in favor of the assignee. But such a
practice is rare, since recordation which might notify creditors would be re-
quired. Assuming that future accounts are assignable, a better method is
available. The money collected is formally turned over to the assignee, and
by him reloaned to the debtor. Thus the accounts are liquidated and replaced
by others newly accruing which must only be stamped and transferred upon
their creation. Unless the business of the assignor decreases, the security of
the assignee remains constant or increases. Thus the assignee, if he desires
to keep his loan secure, need but make certain that the amount of collateral
does not decrease; if it does, he can protect himself by refusing to make fur-
ther loans. If on the other hand the assignment of future accounts is not per-
missible, the method of substitution previously noted may be employed. How-
ever, the assignment might easily become fraudulent if the substitutions are
improperly made. That is to say, when the assignor collects the proceeds
of the accounts assigned, either new accounts must be hypothecated immedi-
ately in equal amounts; or if that be inconvenient, the funds may be segregated
in a separate account, and held by the assignor in a fiduciary capacity for
the assignee until other accounts are transferred.51 Care must be taken that
the assignor does not intermingle proceeds of assigned accounts with other
funds prior to the substitution,5 2 even though the assignee be the depository
bank; 3 and the amount of new accounts assigned must bear some relation to
the sum collected.54 In some states a conveyance that is ineffective for failure
to meet these requirements may be validated by a subsequent taking of pos.
session of the accounts, thus insulating it against the attack of creditors., But
if the assignor's insolvency is known at the time and he is adjudged bankrupt
within four months, the absence of new consideration will make such posses-
51. Radford Grocery Co. v. Haynie, 261 Fed. 349 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); ef. Sexton v,
Kessler, 225 U. S. 90 (1912); Burrowes v. Minochs, 35 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
52. In re Lambert and Braceland Co., 29 F. (2d) 758 (E. D. Pa. 1928); cf. Sexton v.
Kessler, 225 U. S. 90 (1912). A well executed substitution is described in In re Vanity Fair
Slippers, 4 F. Supp. 83 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
53. Blue V. Herkimer National Bank, 30 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); see MeCluer
v. Helm Overly Realty Co., 71 F. (2d) 100, 103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
54. If the amount of accounts assigned is less than the sum collected, the assignee will in
effect have allowed the assignor to use funds belonging to him, without making a new loan,
If the variation were serious it might affect the validity of the transfer. The idea of having
this relation is to preserve the formal fiction of loan and reloan.
55. See note 57, infra. Contra: Clark v. Grimes, 232 Fed. 190 (D. Md. 1916); Arbury v,
Kocher, 18 F. (2d) 588 (W. D. N. Y. 1927); Zartman v. First National Bank of Water.
loo, 189 N. Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907); but cf. In re Wright and Weissinger, 277 Fed 514
(N. D. Miss. 1921) ; Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N. Y. 476, 39 N. E. 11 (1894).
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sion a preference which the trustee in bankruptcy may set aside.3 Some juris-
dictions, however, have held that possession will cure the defect in the original
transfer and date it back to that time,5 7 thus totally eliminating any rights of
creditors under the Bankruptcy Act unless the trustee also represents a Hen or
judgment creditor whose right attached prior to the seizure by the assignee.S
There are, of course, some restrictive consequences. A creditor must not
only show a written or oral agreement, but perhaps a list of accounts and the
disposition of the funds collected from the date of the assignment. Thus it
becomes more difficult fraudulently to create an assignment of book accounts
to a friend or relative immediately prior to bankruptcy, but dated back more
than four months in order to remove it from the rules of the Bankruptcy Act.P
Moreover, the checks of debtors must ordinarily be indorsed or assigned to the
lender, or deposited in a separate fund. In either case such a practise might
become known to other members of the trade and creditors through the infinite
routes by which business men receive information, and the secrecy that borrow-
er and lender have sought to maintain made ineffectual. And the expense of
such financing is increased, along with the risk that an assignment will be held
invalid.
Thus it may be seen that the outstanding result of these several legal restric-
tions upon the assignment of book accounts as collateral security is to penalize
heavily the business that is forced to resort to the practice. If this type of
financing is not objectionable, this result is unfortunate. On the other hand,
the same factors that produce expense and uncertainty serve also as a possible
check upon the extent to which the practice is pursued. This may be desirable
if the practice is objectionable. But if this is the case, a more effective re-
straint might be in order; if it is not, the present restrictions might well be
changed. From either point of view the present state of the law is unsatis-
factory.60 Yet it is not immediately apparent what, if anything, should be done.
Unrestricted freedom in the credit use to be made of accounts has been said
to be in accord with the requirements of present day economy.0 ' Small business
men often find difficulty in acquiring capital unless they can successfully hy-
56. Johnston v. Huff, Andrews and Mloyler Co., 133 Fed. 704 (C. C. A. 4th, 1904); s-e
Walradt v. Miller, 45 F. (2d) 686, 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). Judge Patterson points out that
the New York rule is directly opposed to the Vermont and Machusetts rule. Goldstein v.
RuSch, 54 F. (2d) 86 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
57. Federal Finance Corp. v. Reed, 296 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924); Aa.,chusetts Trust
Co. v. Mac Pherson, 1 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. st, 1924); Harding v. Federal National Bank,
31 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929); cf. Finance and Guaranty Co. v. Oppenheimer, 276
U. S. 10 (1928).
58. See Martin v. Commercial National Bank, 245 U. S. 513, 519; Comment (1934) 44
YALE L. J. 109, 113 (deals with the problem as applied to recordation).
59. See Lichtenberg v. Harvey, 57 F. (2d) S2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
Note the oral agreement held valid in In re Macauley, 158 Fed. 322 (E. D. =ich.
1907); see also Union Trust Co. v. Bulkley, 150 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); Stackhouse
v. Holden, 66 App. Div. 423, 73 N. Y. Supp. 203 (4th Dep't, 1901).
60. Comment (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 175 attacks the conceptualism binding the courts in
regard to chattel mortgages.
61. See Note (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rzv. 279; Comment (1924) 34 YArx L. J. 175.
1935]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
pothecate all their available assets. Moreover, when a business happens to be
temporarily embarrassed, its ability secretly to use book accounts as collateral
may prevent bankruptcy. This may result in a benefit to the creditors, since
forced liquidation of the business, which might otherwise become necessary,
invariably reduces the debtor's assets below their real value with a resulting
loss to creditors.
On the other hand, although these facts urged in favor of the floating charge
may be conceded, other consequences of these assignments are a source of objec-
tion. When viewed in terms of those cases where a loan so secured has failed
to revive the business, and the debtors' assets are depleted, such transactions
usually appear unfair. This fact often seems an unavowed premise of court
opinions.6 2  If resort to this method of securing credit is not usual, but rather
unusual, the continued operation of a business is generally an indication that
resort has not been had to the practice. Certainly this is true where a once
profitable business has encountered misfortune and become insolvent, but con-
tinues to function on the strength of credit advances whose existence is not sub-
ject to discovery. Thus there is an element of deception that colors the treat-
ment of the unsecured creditors. Moreover, the assignment of accounts, as dis-
tinguished from a chattel mortgage which requires recordation for its validity
against third persons, offers an opportunity for a type of fraud peculiar to itself.
Not only are present and future creditors who have no time for investigation
possibly misled, but even those creditors who might use all necessary diligence
may be deceived by the active fraud of the assignor of which his assignee might
have no notice.63 Thus, upon being questioned concerning his present assets,
the assignor might deny the existence of such an assignment. Or even if the
assignee be asked to show his books, and the stamping of accounts be required
by law, as was previously suggested, the assignor might defraud creditors by
keeping two sets. Granting that such a practice is rare because it may result
in exposure and imprisonment, nevertheless it exists, and must be given some
weight in analyzing the merits of the different rules. Finally, objection has
been made in the analogous field of chattel mortgages on the ground that a
merchant may assign all his assets to several creditors, thus forming an effective
shield against the claims of the others who would get nothing in the event of
bankruptcy. This is said to be unfair.
The outstanding objections to the present practice and the "liberal" view
towards assignment of accounts is centered upon the elements of actual or pos-
sible deception. Neither of these difficulties has been adequately met by the
two attempts that have been made to change the present law. The authors of
62. See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925) ; Brown v. Leo, 12 F. (2d) 350, 351 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1926); Leev.State Bank and Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931), Note
the court's attitude in McGill v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 Fed. 637 (D. Md. 1917).
63. Sometimes the assignee makes two assignments of the same account. Under the pre-
vailing American rule and that of the federal courts, the prior assignee takes, regardle.s of
which assignee first notifies the debtor. See Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co,,
264 U. S. 182 (1924); Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N. Y. 508 (1882); Niles v. Mathum, 162
N. Y. 546, 57 N. E. 184 (1900); Comment (1925) 1 WAsH. L. Rav. 47. State law does not
bind the federal courts in regard to this issue. In re Leterman, Becher and Co., Inc., 260




the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act desired merely to abolish the rule
which was affirmed in Benedict v. Ratner."4 With but one overruled excep-
tion,65 the courts have refused to hold the act applicable to book accountsPco
The Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act, which has not yet been passed in any
jurisdiction, proposes to permit the floating charge on present and future book
accounts, but requires recordation. 67 Recordation has not in the past been con-
sidered adequate protection for creditors,cs and at least one recent writer has
shown that this method does not solve the problem. 9 It appears that records do
not protect the smaller creditor because he can not afford to examine them, and
they are not generally necessary for the finance companies and banks, who are
more able to investigate the financial condition of a proposed borrower. Since
actual notice, which alone would be completely effective, would destroy this
method of financing, the problem to be faced is whether ordinary creditors should
be forced to assume a risk greater than they have reason to expect, without
notice thereof. A solution is not easily found; it must depend upon what is con-
sidered the desirable public policy, in the light of actual business facts, as to how
far a debtor may risk the assets of his creditors before their interests become
paramount.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FRAZLER-LEMKE ACT
Trm Frazier-Lemke Federal Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act' passed by
Congress in June, 1934,2 as an amendment to Section 753 of the National
Bankruptcy Act 4 which provided for "agricultural compositions and extensions,"
offers a method whereby a farmer may prevent his creditors from dispossess-
64. GLEzr, op. cit. supra note 12, § 204.
65. American Steamship Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F. (2d) 886 (W. D. N. Y.
1930), afl'd on another point, 49 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
66. Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Irving Trust
Co. v. Finance Service Co., 63 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; In re Frey, 15 F. (2d) 371
(D. Minn. 1926). The statute was ignored in the following cases: In re Almond-Jones Co,
13 F. (2d) 152 (D. Mld. 1926); In re Monumental Shoe Manufacturing Co., 14 F. (2d) S49
(D. Md. 1926); In re Lambert and Braceland Co., 29 F. (2d) 758 (E. D. Pa. 1923).
67. A description of the act will be found in Legis. (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 81.
68. The fact is that in the case of chattel mortgages the right of the mortgagor to sell
was thought to be constructively fraudulent despite the prevalence of recordation statutes
See note 23, supra.
69. Hanna, supra note 1, at 627, points out that recordation merely adds another charge.
1. 48 STAT. 1289, 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1934).
2. P- L. No. 486, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (S. 3580). As originally reported to the
Senate by the Committee on judiciary (Sen. Rep. 1215) the Frazier bill was amended by
the addition of the present Section 7 and then passed. In the House the ,cKeown bill
supplanted the original Lemke bill. The conference report submitted to Senate and Houe.
and passed by both, was substantially similar to the McKeown bill previously adopted by
the House. For a history of the debate on and pasmge of the bill see 78 ComG. REc. 10184,
11273, 11301, 12070-77, 12130-38, 12356, 12376-12382, 12491 (1934).
3. 47 STAT. 1470, 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1933).
4. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1926).
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ing him of his means of livelihood.5 Representatives of the western farming
communities supported the bill wholeheartedly because of continued agitation
on the part of farmers7 for legislation preventing foreclosures, scaling down
their debts, and permitting them to retain their property. There was strong
opposition on the part of a few to the purpose of the bill because of its seeming
reduction of the liens of secured creditors. 8 Moreover, since debate upon and
final passage of the bill in the Senate were unfortunately attended by unusual
haste and confusion because of a misunderstanding over the legislative calendar,
critics of the act may point to these circumstances to prove that it was ill-
considered,9 overlooking the fact that there is no indication of haste during
its formulation in conference, but rather strong evidence that its constitution-
ality was carefully considered. 10
The agitation of farmers for further relief was an open manifestation of the
need for legislation to aid the farm debtor. Existing relief agencies such as
the Federal Land Banks and Joint Stock Land Banks and the Farm Credit
Administration had proved quite inadequate for the task of rescuing the farmer
from the financial plight into which the unprecedented decline in farm prices
had plunged him. 1 Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, which was aimed at
the relief of these conditions, was evidently not satisfactory, for it was rarely
used by farm debtors.1 2  It provided a rather cumbersome machinery whereby
an insolvent farmer after filing a petition might reach a composition or extension
agreement with his creditors under the direction of a Conciliation Commis-
sioner appointed by the court for that purpose. By such means it was hoped
that informal and friendly agreements between farmer and creditor would be
5. See remarks of Senator Frazier, 78 Cong. Rec. 11273 (1934).
6. I.e., Senators Frazier, Clark, Long, Shipstead and Thomas, and Representatives Lemke
(N. Dak.), Jones (Texas), Johnson (Texas), Lloyd (Wash.), Miller (Ark.), Boileau (Wls,)
and Busby (Mis.). Nearly 60 per cent of the farm mortgage debt is concentrated In such
middle western states as Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowai,
Missouri, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. For an excellent discussion of
the farm debt problems see CLARx, THm INTrmNAL DEBTS OF THE UNtr STATEs (1933) 24.
7. Representative Lemke remarked in defending the measure: "There is not a Member
of this Congress who has not received hundreds of letters from farmers asking that some-
thing be done by the Government to protect them and their families against pending or
threatened mortgage foreclosure." 78 CONG. REc. 12134 (1934). See CLARx, op. cit .supra
note 6, at 27, 52.
8. Although the bill passed the Senate in final form by a vote of 60 to 16, it was only
after bitter attacks upon it had been made by Senators Fess, Hastings, Hebert, Lonergan,
and Walsh. For a record of the vote see 78 CONG. REc. 12381 (1934).
9. See the remarks of Senator Hastings, 78 CoNG. REc. 12071 (1934).
10. There were 17 lawyers on the Senate Judiciary Committee and 29 on that of the
House, both of which drafted the bill with great care. A brief on the constitutionality of
the bill was prepared by Representative Lemke. See the remarks of Representatives
Johnson and Lemke, 78 CONG. REC. 12133, 12135 (1934).
11. For a discussion of the inadequacy of such agencies, see CLARx, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 47.
12. For statistics collected from the reports of referees as to the extent of the use of
Section 75, see Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1285.
[Vol. 44
COMMENTS
facilitated and the stigma and hardships of the existing bankruptcy provisions
avoided. At least two outstanding defects greatly lessened the efficiency of
the amendment.' 3 Since the mortgage debt of most farmers represented a
majority of their indebtedness, the requirement that a composition or exten-
sion be agreed to by a majority in number and amount of all the creditors
often tended to grant to a single mortgagee a veto power over composition
and extension proposals. Nor was a mere composition or extension without
any reduction in the amount of the lien deemed sufficiently effective to remedy
the farmer's financial plight, particularly in view of the fact that in the ab-
sence of consent by at least a majority of the secured creditors, there was nothing
to prevent foreclosure and dispossession of the farmer. Even where state
moratorium statutes prevented this, there was no uniform provision to protect
the debtor against both secured and unsecured creditors. The present amend-
ment was calculated to eliminate such defects and to afford the farmer adequate
relief.' 4
Section 75 remains as a vital factor in farm debtor relief by the terms of
the Frazier-Lemke Act. The farmer can invoke the newer procedure by amend-
ing his petition for a composition or extension agreement only if he fails to
reach such an agreement with his creditors or if he feels aggrieved by the one
that is reached. 5 According to recent interpretations of these conditions by
the courts,' 6 the farmer cannot invoke the Frazier-Lemke Act without restric-
tion, but must first in good faith seek a composition or extension agreement
It necessarily follows that he must also be aggrieved for good cause by any
agreement reached before he may proceed according to the terms of the
amendment. When these conditions exist, the farmer may petition at the
first hearing before the court that the referee take measures for insuring reten-
tion of his property. All the property of the debtor is then appraised at its
fair and reasonable value, but not necessarily its market value, by appraisers
appointed by the Court.' 7 After setting aside to the debtor his exemptions
subject to any existing Hens, the referee must order that any part of the debtor's
property which the latter feels he can profitably support shall remain in the
possession of the debtor under the control of the court.18 Such property is
to be subject to a general lien in favor of all creditors up to its actual ap-
praised value, which lien in turn is, as to mortgaged property, to be subject to
13. See Richter, Recent Amendments to the Banhruplcy Act (1933) 8 No=m DAI r
LAwy. 460, 482, 490; Note (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 704; Comment (1934) 43 Y=ii~u L. J.
1285, and articles there cited.
14. In the words of Representative Lemke, the amendment "puts a few teeth into
Section 75!' See 78 Coxo. REc. 12135 (1934).
15. Set forth at the beginning of the amendment, under subsection (s) of Section 75 of
the Bankruptcy Act. The seven sections of the present amendment follow.
16. In re Wilkin, 8 F. Supp. 222 (S. D. Iowa 1934); In re Coller, 8 F. Supp. 447 (E.
D. Pa. 1934); In re Samuelson, 8 F. Supp. 473 (S. D. Iowa 1934).
17. § 1. Objections to appraisals are allowed in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act.
In case of real estate either the debtor or creditor may file objections within one year




any prior liens of secured creditors. As to the secured claims, if the amount
of the secured debt is greater than the appraised value of the pledged property,
apparently the excess can be proved as a general claim and participate in the
distribution of the appraised value of the unencumbered property ratably with
unsecured claims.' 9 Upon request of the debtor and with the consent of the
lien holders the trustee may arrange a "sale" to the debtor of the property in
his possession2" under one of two alternative methods of procedure. Under
the first of these, provided by Section 3, the property is to be sold to the
debtor at the appraised price, which is to be paid over a period of six years
in gradually increasing annual installments along with interest on the unpaid
balance. The debtor may at any time consume or dispose of any property in
his possession provided he pays over the full appraised value to the creditors.21
If the debtor defaults in any payments, the creditors may proceed to enforce
their respective liens at law.22  All proceeds from the sale of the property, and
the interest, are to be distributed to the various creditors. The only major change
in this procedure to be found in the second alternative, set forth in Section 7,
is that there the debtor is granted an extension of only five years in which
to pay the appraised value of the property in his possession, and is required
to pay a reasonable annual rental in place of interest or installments on the
appraised value. Reappraisal of the value of real estate at the end of five
years at the request of any lien holder is also provided. Thus allowance is
made for any rise in land values throughout the period, since the lien holder
may choose whether to accept the appraised or reappraised price. Under either
section, if the debtor complies with all requirements throughout the respective
extension periods, he receives his discharge and takes full title to the property.
Such a novel combination of provisions presents a constitutional problem
that has incited a great deal of controversy.23 According to Article I, Section
8, of the United States Constitution, Congress has the power to establish
"Uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States."
Since the Frazier-Lemke Act is an amendment to Section 75 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, it must be justified as an exercise of the bankruptcy powers so
delegated to Congress. This involves the question whether the act does in
fact deal with "bankruptcy." The varied history of bankruptcy in the United
States emphasizes the broad and ill-defined nature of the subject.24 In the four
19. Since the general lien created by the provision is not limited specifically to tin-
secured creditors, lenholders would apparently be general creditors to the extent of the
excess. This allows secured creditors the same rights that they possess under Sections 56
(b) and 57 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act. See 30 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 92 (b),
93 (e) (1926). Such an interpretation was accepted by the court in In re Radford, 8 F.
Supp. 489, 497 (W. D. Ky. 1934). See Hanna, Agriculture and the Bankruptcy Act (1934)
19 MIN. L. Rxv. 1, 18.
20. § 3. 21. § 4. 22. § 5.
23. See Hanna, supra note 19, at 1, and references cited, id. at 10, n. 13; Legislation
(1934) 23 GEo. L. J. 87; Note (1934) 3 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 86; Comment (1935) 29 ILL.
L. REv. 645; (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 375.
24. For a historical summary of bankruptcy law in the United States, see 1 RzamoNGro,
BA Ruprcy (3d ed. 1923) 1; HANNA, CASES ON CREIrroRs' RIOuTS (1931) 527.
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National Bankruptcy Laws, each one enacted toward the end of a major de-
pression to check the resulting detrimental economic forces,2- the concept of
the specific function intended to be performed has differed greatly.-G From
the theory inherent in the first law of 1800 that the primary function of a
bankruptcy law was the protection of creditors against the fraudulent practices
of debtors26 has gradually evolved the much broader modern concept that
bankruptcy is for the benefit of both debtor and creditor, relieving the debtor
by a discharge from the remainder of his debts while affording the latter a
pro rata distribution of the debtor's assets and protection from fraudulent con-
veyances and preferences. 7  In addition there has been a provision for en-
forcing upon the minority'of creditors acceptance of a plan of composition as-
sented to by the majority, thus making it possible to leave the debtor in pos-
session of his property after changing his debt structure.2 In view of these
various provisions the only definition of bankruptcy that is both appropriate
and comprehensive is that it deals generally with the relations between "insolv-
ent debtors" and their creditors.9 The manner of dealing with such rela-
tions, however, may apparently change considerably with time and economic
conditions.
If the limits of the "subject of bankruptcies" are so extensive, the Frazier-
Lemke Act meets the requirements of the Constitution. Upon its face it
deals with the relations of insolvent debtors and their creditors. The fact that
the procedure under the act may differ somewhat from previous concepts of
bankruptcy proceedings is immaterial. The laws which first extended bank-
ruptcy relief to debtors other than traders 0 and provided for voluntary bank-
ruptcies30 and composition and extension proposals3 ' were radical departures
from previous ideas on the subject, but have been upheld as constitutional.
The only really new elements in the present act are the extension of time al-
lowed for effecting distribution of the farmer's assets during which the creditor
is deprived of his share, and the method of converting the assets into cash
25. The Act of 1800 following the depression of 1798; the Act of 1841 following the
panic of 1837; the Act of 1867 necessitated by the crises of the Civil War; the present Act
of 1898 passed as a result of the panic of 1893.
26. The Act of 1800 aimed at the suppression of fraudulent and criminal practices of
debtors; the Act of 1841 was the first to provide for voluntary bankruptcy; the Act of
1898 changed the meaning of insolvency from inability to meet one's obligations to include
an excess of liabilities over assets. See RumInGTon, op. cit. supra note 24, at 14.
27. Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549 (1915); In
re Munford, 255 Fed. 108 (E. D. N. C. 1919); Gilbert v. Shouse, 61 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932); see In re Leslie, 119 Fed. 405, 410 (N. D. N. Y. 1903).
28. Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
29. Mr. Justice Catron gave some indication of the indefinability of the subject in In
re Klein, reported in a note to Nelson v. Carland, 1 How. 265, 277 (U. S. 1843). Chief
Justice Marshall found trouble in "discriminating with any accuracy between insolvent
and bankrupt laws." See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 195 (U. S. 1819).
30. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 (1902).
31. In re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); In re Burgh, and In re
Parmenter, 7 F. Supp. 184 (N. D. Ill. 1933).
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for distribution. Such a change in procedure, which is an attempt to meet the
conditions of the present economic emergency, by no means robs the act of
its character of bankruptcy legislation, since the subject matter is the same
regardless of how it is treated.
Although the Frazier-Lemke Act may come within the delegated power of
Congress to legislate upon the "subject of bankruptcies," it remains further
to inquire whether the exercise of that power under the act is so unjust or
unreasonable as to amount to a deprivation of creditors' property without due
process of law under the Fifth amendment. The powers of Congress are often
said to be "plenary," and considerable discretion may be used in their ex-
ercise; but it must be recognized that by judicial interpretation the Fifth
Amendment may be used as a check upon them.8 2  In applying the test of
the due process clause it is permissible to indulge in a presumption in favor
of the constitutionality of the act so that it will be pronounced unconstitutional
only if definitely unreasonable. 3  And when there are possible alternative in-
terpretations of provisions, the one most conducive to constitutionality should
control.84
With respect to secured creditors the question of constitutionality depends
ultimately upon the reasonableness of the second alternative, open to them
under Section 7, since this alone of the two plans can be forced upon them.
Acceptance of the first alternative under Section 3 is "voluntary" in the sense
that consent of all secured creditors is necessary to make binding the terms
arranged by the trustee;8 5 otherwise Section 7 alone will apply. Should the
secured creditors agree to terms thus arranged under Section 3, they can hardly
raise a subsequent complaint as to the reasonableness of their agreement.
Certainly this is true if the complaint were that the plan was less favorable
than could be had under Section 7, for as between the alternatives their choice
is unimpaired. And if the agreement under Section 3 is more favorable than
one that would have resulted under Section 7, complaint must be based on the
fact that the acceptance was not in fact voluntary, but was influenced by the
possibility that refusal to accept would have resulted in application of the
other section. This objection is sound only if the terms provided in Section 7
are of themselves unreasonable.
In respect to monetary return, it is contemplated that the lien holders will
recover substantially the same amount under the act that they could under
their previously existing rights, had the farmer gone into bankruptcy. As the
appraised price that must be paid to creditors is the fair and reasonable value
32. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336 (1892); Han-
over National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 192 (1902); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S.
531, 542 (1927); in re Billing, 145 Fed. 395, 398 (M. D. Ala. 1906); In re Bradford, 7
F. Supp. 665 (D. Md, 1934). Contra: In re Cope, 8 F. Supp. 778 (D. Colo. 1934).
33. United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210 (1919).
34. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Washington Rr. and Navigation Co.,
288 U. S. 14 (1933).
35. It appears to be a reasonable interpretation of Section 3 that the terms of payment
there prescribed are a minimum, above which the trustee may impose any different term
that in his judgment would be "fair and equitable."
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of the property that he retains, but not necessarily the market value, presum-
ably the amount thus required is as great, and probably greater, than the
present market price of the property on a judicial sale for cash. Thus, in
effect, the lien holder receives the full value of the asset, which is determined by
the appraisal rather than by the results of competitive bidding on a cash
basis regardless of market conditions. Should the appraised value be less than
the face of his debt, he also receives the equivalent of a deficiency judgment
by virtue of the fact that a secured creditor may prove such a claim as a
general debt, and hence be awarded a pro rata share of the other assets.10 The
method of determining the amount of the deficiency is similar in effect to pro-
visions in state moratorium statutes restricting deficiency judgments to the
difference between the amount of the debt and the appraised value of the se-
curity,3 while the permission to prove the amount as a general debt is the
same that is given to secured creditors under the Bankruptcy Act?- More-
over, remuneration in the form of rent is provided during the period that pay-
ment is withheld. Thus the decrease in value that is due to future rather than
present payment is compensated. In this respect the act conforms perfectly to
the chief requirement of reasonableness set up by the courts for testing state
moratorium statutes, where the same question has arisen and the element of
compensation held to be essential. 8
Pure monetary return, however, is not the only interest of the secured credi-
tor that is a possible subject of prejudice. Under Section 7 the lien holder is
completely deprived of the chance to secure physical possession of the debtor's
property, which, under certain circumstances, he might be able to secure despite
bankruptcy proceedings. Yet if the farmer makes all required payments, the
creditor receives at the end of five years the appraised or reappraised value of
the property. It seems reasonable that if the law guarantees to the mortgagee
the fair value of his security, he should have no cause for complaint. The
large majority of mortgagees are insurance companies, banks, and federal farm
relief agencies,3 9 creditors that have little interest in acquiring actual possession
of the debtor's property 40 The primary purpose of a mortgage therefore should
be a security device and its use for the purpose of dispossessing the farmer in
periods of financial distress is a practice that should be discouraged for the
welfare of the farming communities and hence the nation as a whole.
The five-year period during which the creditor must wait, without any con-
36. See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 580a; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 150;
Kan. Laws 1933, c. 218; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 794; N. C. CoDE Ama;. (Bfichie, Supp. 1933)
§ 2593 (d); S. C. Acts 1933, No. 264; Tex. Laws 1933, c. 92.
37. If the proceeds of a foreclosure sale are insufficient to pay in full the secured debt,
the mortgagee may share in the distribution of the general assets in proportion to the amount
of his deficiency. See In re Aledina Quarry Co., 179 Fed. 929, 936 (W. D. N. Y. 1910).
38. Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Hanauer v.
Republic Building Co., 255 N. W. 136 (Wis. 1934).
39. See 78 CONG. Rm 12132 (1934); CLArK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 40.
40. Some of the Land Banks have followed the policy of avoiding forcclosures so long
as the farmer pays out of his crop receipts the amount that would probably be received
in rent from a tenant. See CLrA, op. cit. supra note 6, at 44.
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trol over the debtor's property and without receiving payment of the appraised
value thereof, is another possible source of prejudice to the creditor's rights.
Although he is compensated during such a period, and by demanding a reap-
praisal of real estate may take advantage of a rise in farm land values, he has
lost the right to make his own terms with the debtor. As a result there is the
possibility that a rise in farm values or an improvement in the debtor's financial
condition would not be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the com-
pensation paid to the creditors. Likewise the loss of the opportunity for present
liquidation means that the creditor bears the risk of having subsequently to sell
the land at a lower price in case the debtor defaults in his payments. Both
these elements of deprivation and of risk, however, have been present in the
extension provisions of state moratorium laws.41 It is true that under the latter
the postponement of the period of redemption or of the confirmation of sale has
never been for a period longer than two years.41 By comparison a five-year
extension under the Frazier-Lemke Act may seem to be unreasonably long
and to impose a much greater risk. But the power of the states under their
police powers to deal with creditors' rights is much more restricted than is the
delegated power of Congress to deal with the subject of bankruptcy.42 To
deprive a creditor of the right to instant payment or of the power to make his
own arrangements concerning future risk is no more serious a destruction of
rights than has already been permitted under the Bankruptcy Act, where
contracts may be disaffirmed, debts discharged and compositions enforced
against minority groups. Moreover, the question of reasonableness is not
necessarily the same in judging this statute as it is in the case of state mora-
torium laws. The state laws deal with mortgages generally; the present law
deals only with farm mortgages.43 The latter class may well be distinguished
as presenting a peculiar problem of a somewhat more serious nature, the solu-
tion of which must be independent of the former. The economic status of the
farmer may be such as to make lesser relief inadequate. Therefore the reason-
ableness of the act should not be considered solely in the light of the emergency
conditions that are held to justify state moratorium laws.44
41. Blanket extensions of period of redemption: KAN. REv. STAT. AN. (Supp. 1933)
§ 60-3457-a-b (6 months); N. D. Laws 1933, c. 157 (2 years); S. D. Laws 1933, c, 137 (1
year); Wis. Laws Spec. Sess. 1931, c. 29, § 7. Discretionary Extension: Manx. STAT.
.(Mason, Supp. 1934) § 9633-5. Blanket postponements of sale: CAL. GEN. LAWS, (Deering,
Supp. 1933) Act 5102, § 1 (6 months); Tex. Laws 1933, c. 109. Discretionary Postpone-
ments of sale: Ark. Acts 1933, No. 21, § 3; Mur. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1934) § 9633-3; N.
H. Laws 1933, c. 161; Pa. Laws 1933, No. 137. For comprehensive discussions of the con-
stitutionality of state mortgage relief legislation see Comment (1934) 47 HAuv. L, REv. 660;
Comment (1934) 18 RNx. L. Rxv. 319; Comment (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. REV. 261.
42. No provision of the Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from impairing the
obligations of contracts as the Fourteenth Amendment does the States. See Mitchell v,
Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 643 (1883).
43. Section 75, to which the Frazier-Lemke Act is an amendment, comes under the
heading "Agricultural Compositions and Extensions." All relief under the section Is limited
to farmers. Recently a breeder of pedigreed dogs attempted to qualify as a farmer under
the act. See N. Y. Times, Dec. '6, 1934, at 8, col. 5.
44. Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
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Reasonableness of the Act with respect to unscecured creditors presents but
few additional questions. With one exception the treatment of unsecured cred-
itors under Section 7 differs from their treatment under the terms of the Bank-
ruptcy Act in the same manner as does that of secured creditors: namely in
the time of payment and in the ability to dispossess a debtor of his assets.
But they do not receive, as secured creditors do, the benefit of a provision for
reappraisal of the assets subject to a lien in their favor. The distinction is
nevertheless sound, for with respect to general creditors bankruptcy does not
modify previously existing rights but rather grants valuable ones not possessed
before. This means that unsecured creditors are affected by Section 7 in the
same manner as secured creditors although in a slightly different degree because
of their previously distinct position.
There is, however, a different limitation upon the rights of unsecured creditors
that must be considered. They may be made subject to either Section 3 or Sec-
tion 7, and their protection against less favorable treatment under Section 3 than
under Section 7 depends not upon their own choice, but lies with the secured
creditors or the trustee appointed to arrange the terms of sale. Yet the inter-
ests of the secured and unsecured creditors are the same for the purpose of ar-
ranging terms, since each payment made by the former is distributed to the
two classes of creditors in the same proportion under either alternative. The
secured creditors will naturally try to obtain terms under Section 3 fully as
favorable as those in Section 7, and in this manner will serve to protect the
unsecured creditors. This situation is similar to the familiar procedure in
composition agreements, under Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act, where creditors
with the same interests can by agreement preclude objection on the part of dis-
senters. The most that any single lien holder is apt to do that Will affect the
interests of a general creditor is to force him to proceed under the reasonable
provisions of Section 7. If any additional safeguard is needed, it is found in the
trustee, whose function it is to prescribe the terms of "sale" under Section 3.
Conceivably the provision therein to the effect that he may prescribe "such other
conditions" as in his judgment shall be "fair and equitable" give him sufficient
discretion to require different though not lesser terms than those prescribed by
the act. Thus by community of interest with the lien creditors and by the
discretionary power of the trustee, the unsecured creditor is protected against
receiving less favorable terms than the reasonable ones that must result under
Section 7. As a method of administration calculated to protect creditors and
still to permit flexible application, the act seems well adapted to serve both
purposes.
The only conclusion with respect to the Frazier-Lemke Act that can fairly
be reached at this time is that in its general features it seems to be directed to-
ward a legitimate end and to be appropriate to accomplish that end. No at-
tempt has here been made to deal with all the innumerable criticisms~r that
45. A few of such criticisms are that the application of the act is not limited to the
period of the emergency; that the moratorium periods are too long; that there is no pro-
vision for the payment of taxes over the moratorium period under Section 7; that there
is no concrete provision for a deficiency judgment; that the terms "value," "appraked
value," and "market value" are left vague and undefined; that no provision is made for d--
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have been directed at the act both by courts48 and legal scholars.4 7 Nearly
all such objections have been concerned with various procedural defects 48 rather
than with the fundamental theory of the statute. Novel pieces of legislation
seldom fail to elicit just such a barrage of criticism, for without the aid
of experience it is impossible for the authors of a bill or its critics to realize
fully all its far-reaching implications. It is reasonable to believe that when
sufficient time has been given to courts and legal scholars to familiarize them-
selves with the new amendment and to explore its resources, many of the
previous objections will appear either unnecessary or illusory.
TAXATION OF SUMS RECEIVED UNDER RIGHTS TO FUTURE
PERIODIC PAYMENTS
IN THE early stages of our present income tax regime, before the penumbra
between that which was clearly within the meaning of the income tax provi-
sions of the federal statutes and that which was clearly without, was penetrated
by legal decisions, considerable speculation prevailed on the taxability of sums
received under present rights to future periodic payments, such rights having
been either purchased by or granted to the taxpayer.1 While the sums re-
ceived under these rights were recognized as such periodic increases of wealth to
the donee as are generally regarded by economists as constituting "income,"
there was the possibility that the term "income" as used in the Act included
only those increases of wealth derived from services or the use of capital.2 If
the sums at their source were not "income" in the latter sense, they were there-
fore taxable neither to the donee nor to the donor. Moreover, even were the
payments "income" at their source, the fact that these sums were integral parts
of a gift, made their taxation to the donee doubtful in view of the specific
statutory exemption of gifts;3 and the fact that the assignment or gift of the
posal of property not retained by the debtor; that no rent need be paid during the first
six months under Section 7; that the junior ilenholder is placed in a hopeless position; that
a judicial review of appraisals is uncertain.
46. See In re Bradford, 8 F. Supp. 665 (1934).
47. See Britton, The Farm Moratorium Amendment (1934) 9 J. NAT'Lt Ass'N REERn. xu
BANx. 41; Hanna, The Frazier-Lemke Amendments to Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act
(1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 687; Hanna, supra note 19.
1. See Magill, The Income Tax Liability of Annuities and Similar Periodical Payments
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 229; Maguire, Capitalization of Periodical Payments by Gift (1920)
34 HARv. L. Rv. 20; Maguire, Income Taxes on the Realization of Future Interests (1922)
31 YALE L. J. 367.
2. This has been the Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning of the term. See
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185 (1918); Eisnet v. Macomber, 252 1. S.
189, 207 (1920).
3. Section 22(b) of the Revenue Act of 1932 provides:--"The following items shall not
be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this title." ...
"(3) Gifts, Bequests, and Devises.-The value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or inheritance (but the income from such property shall be included in gross in-
come)." 47 STAT. 178 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1934) § 3022 (b) (3).
The above section of the 1932 Act is substantially the same as Section 22 (b) (2) of the
1928 Act and 213 (b) (2) of the 1924 and 1926 Acts.
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income prevented it from accruing to the donor seemed to preclude its taxa-
tion to the assignor or donor.4 Yet there remained the powerful consideration
that it was the undoubted intention of Congress to tax all increases in wealth
derived from services or the use of capital. And even though these difficulties
were resolved by the courts in favor of reaching the income, there remained
the problem of whom to tax, the donor or the donee. The philosophy behind
the surtaxes established by the statute contemplated placing the largest tax on
him who could best bear it. Considerations of fairness favored taxing the sums
to the donee since it was he who was enjoying the benefits of the income. But
such a policy presented possible embarrassment to the administration of the tax
since it could permit an owner of property being taxed under the higher brackets
to evade the higher surtaxes to some extent by merely making a division in the
taxable stream of income among the members of his family, the resulting tribu-
taries of which would all be taxed at lower rates than the single stream.5 Spe-
cifically, the resolution of these considerations has centered about three fact
situations: payments received under terminable rights to the income of property
held in trust or otherwise; charges on property created by will or grant; and
annuities.
The first case to be decided by the Supreme Court involving the taxability
of payments received under a terminable right to the income of property held in
trust or otherwise, was Irwin v. GavitG wherein it was held that the sums re-
ceived by a taxpayer pursuant to a legacy of part of the income from a testa-
mentary trust, were taxable income to him. Logically the decision is far from
impregnable. Payments received under such a right may plausibly be regarded
as part of a continuing gift made by the testator,7 and therefore exempt under
the statute.8 Or the subject of the gift may be said to be the right to the future
payments,9 in which case the payments themselves would not properly be tax-
able in full as income.'0 But since tax laws are practical instruments for obtain-
ing income for governmental needs and not perfection of logic, the Supreme
4. The Revenue Act provides for taxing an individual for only that income which
accrued to him in the preceding year. See note 11, injra. If the income from a fund is
assigned away before it is realized, it may be regarded as never accruing to the owner
of the fund, and therefore not taxable to him.
5. See U. S. v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506 (84 U. S. 1873).
6. 268 U. S. 161 (1925). Noted in (1925) 25 COL. L. Rnv. 945; (1925) 20 Ir... L.
REv. 405; (1925) 74 U. or PA. L. REv. 182.
7. See dissent by Sutherland J., in Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 16S (1925); Irwin
v. Gavit, 275 Fed. 643 (N. D. N. Y. 1921); Note (1925) 25 CoL. L. Rav. 945, 946. See
also United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 137, 188 (1928) (statutes not to be extended
beyond their dear meaning, and every doubt to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer).
8. See note 3, supra.
9. Magill, supra note 1, at 236 (suggesting that the legatee should not be taxed until
the payments received equalled the value of the right to the future payments when first
received); Comment (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 945, 946.
10. Logically, the yearly income which should be taxed to the beneficiary under this
theory should be the increase in capital value of the right to the current payment from the
time the right was first granted to the time the payment is actually received. But cf.
Magill, supra note 1, at 236.
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Court could well forsake the literal meaning of the statute in favor of Con-
gressional intent and so give effect to the practical exigencies. Thus, it probably
was the intention of Congress to tax all earnings from capital investments.,
But by a specific statutory exemption, the income paid out under such a right
as was involved in Irwin v. Gavit was deductible by the trustee.12 Hence if
the sums so paid out were not taxed to the beneficiary, a part of the taxing
power intended to have been used by Congress, would be negated. Moreover,
in terms of income to the donee, the gift here was essentially the same as a
gift to the beneficiary of the corpus itself for enjoyment during a like term.Y'
Since in the latter case the income from the property would undoubtedly have
been taxable to the donee, it seems only fair that the beneficiary in cases like
Irwin v. Gavit should be taxed likewise for the full amount of the income re-
ceived from the trust.
But while the decision in Irwin v. Gavit precludes further consideration of
exactly similar fact situations, other closely allied cases are as yet undetermined.
The first group consists of those cases where the trust device is not used, but
the right to future income is separated from the fund by gift or gratuitous
assignment. The points of similarity between these cases and Irwin v. Gavit
are commanding. The fact that the trust device is dispensed with makes the
gift none the less one of the income from a specific fund, a factor considered
important in the Gavit case.14 Moreover, in either case the severance of the
income from the fund out of which it flows may be as complete as in the other,
thereby depriving the owner of the fund of the future enjoyment or control of
the income thereof. And while it was suggested in Irwin v. Gavit that the gift
of the income of the trust could be held taxable to the beneficiary on the ground
that the taxpayer received an equitable interest in the trust fund from which
he derived the income, 15 the same can as readily be said of the interest received
by the assignee of income. There is, however, the possibility that to hold the
assignee taxable for the income, would provide an avenue for wholesale eva-
11. The Income Tax Act of 1913, c. 16, Section II, A. subd. 1, provides for levying a
tax on the entire net income accruing and arising from all sources in the preceding calendar
year to'every citizen of the United States. 38 STAT. 166 (1913). This has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court as being "any gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined." Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415 (1913); Doyle v,
Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207
(1920).
12. Section 162 of the Revenue Act of 1932 provides: "The net income of the estate or
trust shall be computed in the same manner and on the same basis as in the case of an
individual, except that "... . (b) There shall be allowed as an additional deduction In com-
puting the net income of the state or trust the amount of the income of the estate or trust
for its taxable year which is to be distributed currently by the fiduciary to the beneficiaries."
47 STAT. 220 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 3161 (a) (2) (Supp. 1934). This is the same as
Section 162 of the 1928 Act, and substantially the same as Section 219 (b) (2) of the 1926
Act.
13. See Comment (1925) 74 U. or PA. L. REv. 182, 185.
14. See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 168 (1925). See also Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283
U. S. 148, 151 (1931).
15. See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 167 (1925).
[Vol. 44
COMMENTS
sion of the spirit if not the letter of the law by intra-family assignments, and
similar arrangements to reduce surtaxes.'0 But such a purpose can already be
effected through the simple trust device,17 and hence a similar treatment of
assignments would not greatly expand the existing opportunities for evasion.
And if a real necessity arises for checking such evasion, Congress can easily
provide an effective remedy by merely making income from property taxable to
the owner of the fund, a suggestion which the Supreme Court has already inti-
mated would be a lawful use of the taxing power.28 Considerations of fairness
too, point to taxing assigned income to the assignee. Similar to the situation in
Irwin v. Gavit, a gift or assignment of income is not substantially different from
a gift of the corpus for a like term, and as has been pointed out, consistency
in the treatment of taxpayers demands that the income be taxed to the assignee
as it is to the donee of property for a term.13 Moreover, since the assignee is
the one who receives the benefits of and enjoys the income, the size of the sur-
tax on the assigned income should logically be determined on the basis of the
assignee's total income rather than on the assignor's.
But while a resolution of the above arguments would seem to favor taxation
of assigned income to the assignee, such a resolution can be made only in those
cases in which the severance of the right to future income from its fund, is as
complete as in the case of the gift of the income from an irrevocable trust.
Where some power to alter the flow of income to the assignee or donee is re-
tained by the assignor or donor, other additional factors become important,
and appear to favor a contrary result. Conceptually, the transaction then
takes on more of the aspects of a voluntary transfer of income to the donee
each year as it is earned; in which case it would be taxable only to the donor 10
It is true there is the existence of the continuing right of the donee to the
future income veiling the transaction; but if the right is subject to the will of
the donor it is not substantially more than an expectancy arising out of the
donor's generosity, which is the situation where the gifts are made independently,
year by year, under no guise of an existing right. Were the owner of property
allowed to escape high surtaxes by such a device as this, possibilities of evasion
would be considerably broadened.20 Men's fear for the future and their con-
16. The fact that such arrangements are made for the express purpose of reducing taxa-
tion and circumventing the effects of the tax statutes is no ground for holding them void.
See U. S. v. Ishama, 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 496, 506 (1873).
17. See Irwin v. Gavit in conjunction with note 16, supra. But this result is reached
only when the property is subject to an irrevocable trust. Where the settlor retains a right
to revoke the trust, the income therefrom is taxable to the settlor by specific statutory pro-
vision. See Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 221 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 960 (Supp. 1934) § 3166, same as Section 166 of the 1928 Act and Section 219 (g) of the
1926 and 1924 Acts.
18. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 114-119 (1930). In this case the court said that
Congress had power to tax earnings of wage earners to those who earned them. By anal-
ogy the receipts from property could be made taxable to the owners of the property.
19. See Maguire, supra note 1, at 22.
20. As has been pointed out before, this avenue of escape where trusts are used, has
been obviated by a specific statutory provision taxing the income from revocable trusts
to the settlor. See note 17, supra.
1935] . 63
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
sequent desire to retain control over their future income, which now tends to
restrain them from using such devices as irrevocable trusts and assignments
to avoid surtaxes, would no longer provide a barrier to evasion.
Just how much control need be kept by the donor or assignor before taxa-
tion will be imposed on him rather than on the assignee, is an open question.
So far, the cases seem to indicate that only where, prior to the realization of
the income, it has been irrevocably assigned away, will the tax be levied on the
assignee instead of the assignor.21  Thus where an insurance agent assigned
to a third person the right to the income from a contract binding an insurance
company to pay commissions on renewal premiums of policies which the agent
had sold, the assignee was taxed for the income arising under the contract. - 2
And where the owner of bonds clipped all the interest coupons from his securi-
ties and gave them to another, the donee and not the owner of bonds was held
taxable for the income accruing under the bonds. 23 But where an owner of
certain stocks assigned to another the right to future dividends therefrom, it was
denied that he had shifted income tax liability on the stock to the assignee
because of the ease with which the assignor could have avoided the effect of the
whole transaction by simply transferring his shares to a third party.P1 And the
assignment of the right to the future income from a lease has not had the effect
of shifting taxation to the assignee 25 because of the possibility that the lease
21. There is considerable dictum to the effect that the owner of personal property
can escape assessment for income tax only by assigning away the corpus as well as the
income. See Rosenwald v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 423, 426 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); Ward
v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 757, 760 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); cf. Bishop v. Commissloner,
54 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); Mitchell v. Bowers, 15 F. (2d) 287 (C. C. A. 2d'
1926), cert. denied 273 U. S. 759 (1927). However, in several cases where only the in-
come was transferred the assignee or donee was held taxable. See Rosenwald v. Com-
mission supra; Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied 285 U. S.
552 (1932) ; Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932), cert, denied 287 U. S.
565 (1932).
22. Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied 285 U. S. $52 (1932>
(assignee of rights of insurance agent to renewal commissions held taxable); Nelson v.
Ferguson, 56 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932) (assignee of rights to the profits from certain,
patents held taxable to the assignee). Contra: Bishop v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 298
(C. C. A. 7th, 1931); Ellis v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. 1195 (1932). In the latter cases
a distinction was drawn on the ground that only the income from the contracts had been.
assigned whereas in cases where the assignor had been taxed, the contract right itself had
been assigned. This distinction is unwarranted, however, because in the Hall v. Burnet and
Nelson v. Ferguson cases the corpus was the contract itself, which was not assigned; only
the right to the income accruing under the contract was assigned.
23. Rosenwald v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
24. Rosenwald v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 423, 426 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); cf. Bettendorf
v. Commissioner, 49 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) (where donor transferred corpus of
stock certificates reserving the right to the dividends, the donor was held taxable for the
income from the shares); Turner v. Commissioner, 28 B. T. A. 91 (1933) Varnell v. Com-
missioner, 28 B. T. A. 231 (1933).
25. Ward v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 757 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); cf. Bing v. Bowers,
22 F. (2d) 450 (S. D. N. Y. 1927), aff'd per curiam on opinion below, 26 F. (2d) 1017?
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
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might be terminated, or transferred by the lessor, thereby destroying the right
of the assignee to the future income? 0 But while the facility with which an
assignor of dividends from stock can avoid the consequences of his act may be
sufficient reason to justify taxing the dividends to the assignor under the test
of control, it may nevertheless be said that an assignment of rent sufficiently
divests the assignor of control and future enjoyment of the rents, as to justify
taxing the income to the assignee under Irwin v. Gavit.
-
A still more difficult problem for determination is presented where the assign-
ment of the income from securities is for only a single year and is made prior
to the year in which the income will be realized. Under Irwin v. Gavil will
such a transaction accomplish the desired effect of shifting the taxation of the
income for the one year to the assignee? If the arguments postulated in Irwin
v. Gavit are carried to their logical conclusion, this type of transaction would
make the income accruing thereunder taxable to the assignee as though he had
been given the right to the income for a period of years. And, argumentatively,
the same practical considerations exist in regard to the assignment of the income
for a single year as for a period of years. It is true the payment of a single
sum does not satisfy the usual requirement in income of periodicity of receipt -
But in irwin v. Gavit the test which was applied to the payments was not what
the payments were to the beneficiary, but what they were at their source, and
what they were in terms of the grant by the assignor or donor. The income
from a single year, under that test, is as much "income" as if for a period of
years. And the courts have consistently refused to endorse periodicity as an
essential requisite of income under the Act.- Practically, however, where the
assignment is for only one year in advance, the transaction approaches re-
markably close to the case where there is no assignment at all, but merely a
voluntary gift of the income each year. The resultant possibility of evasion
may well have the effect of limiting Irwin v. Gavit to only those cases where
the income has been assigned for a period of years.
A question somewhat analogous to that raised in the latter case is whether
the assignee will be taxed for sums accruing under an assignment for a sub-
stantial term, subject, however, to revocation on notice to be given in the pre-
ceding tax year. Since the assignor can never obtain the use of the income
for the current year, it can be said that the tax should be levied on the assignee.
The revocation provision, however, opens possibilities of evasion similar to tho-e
in the preceding case, which may justify a departure from Irin v. Gavit. A
26. See Ward v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d.) 757, 760 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
27. The fact that the assignee's right to the future income would be defeated by the
tenant's forefeiture of the lease seems insufficient to hold the assignor taxable, since this
contingency would not be within the control of the assignor, and is exceedingly remote. And
it would seem that an assignment of the income of a lease would be valid even as against
an assignee of the lease itself if the first assignment were recorded.
28. See Trefry v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N. E. 904 (1917) ; United States v. Oregon-
Washington Rr. & Navigation Co., 251 Fed. 211, 212 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Magill, supfta
note 1, at 223.
29. Thus a gain derived from a sale of capital assets has been held taxable income in
the year in which the sale was made. Merchant's Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255
U. S. 509 (1921); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179 (1918).
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similar problem has arisen in the taxation of the income from trusts subject
to analogous revocation provisions, and the tax in the latter instance has been
placed on the beneficiary rather than the settlor.30 But in view of the fact that
this result was based solely on an interpretation of the statute prescribing under
what conditions the settlor was to be taxed,3' and that the courts have been
slow to carry trust analogies over into assignments, the decisions in these cases
do not necessarily preclude a 'different result in the case of assignments with
like revocation provisions.
The leading case involving the taxability of charges on property created by
will or grant is Burnet v. Whitehouse,82 in which the Supreme Court held that
sums received by the taxpayer under a devise of an annuity chargeable on the
corpus of the estate as well as the income thereof, were not taxable income to
him. This was followed by the recent case of Helvering v. Pardee,83 involving
substantially the same transaction, where it was held that the trustee of the
property on which the annuity was charged, could claim no deduction by virtue
of the payments made to the beneficiary. Once Burnet v. Whitehouse Is
accepted, the result reached in the latter case may be explained merely as a
convenient escape from permitting the income from some capital funds to go
untaxed.8 4 It is arguable, however, that this type of transaction should be
treated no differently than the one involved in Irwin v. Gavit. It is not unlikely
that the testator intended the same result, in terms of income to the donee, in
both cases; and that result is often reached in terms of the source of the pay.
ments because the testator usually sets aside enough property to pay the an.
nuity out of the income alone.3, The fact that in periods of depression the
trustee may have to dip into the corpus to pay the income designated by will,
hardly appears to alter the basic nature of the transaction sufficiently to justify
a distinction in taxation. From the standpoint of surtax philosophy, it would
seem fairer, as in the case of a gift only of income, if the tax were measured
30. Langley v. Commissioner, 61 F. (2d) (C. C A. 2d, 1932); Lewis v. White, 6 F.
(2d) 390 (D. C. Mass. 1932), afPd per curiam 61 F. (2d) 1046 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932).
31. The discussion turned almost entirely on the interpretation of the stipulation which
taxed the income to the grantor when the trust was revocable "at any time during the
taxable year." See supra note 17. No such narrow limitation is applicable to similar
provisions in assignments.
32. 283 U. S. 148 (1931), noted in (1931) 31 COL. L. Rxv. 1053.
33. 54 Sup. Ct. 221 (U. S. 1933), consolidating lower court cases of Pardee v. Com-
missioner, 63 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Title Guarantee Loan and Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Butterworth v. Commissioner, 63 F.
(2d) 944 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 63 F.
(2d) 949 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); (1934) 34 COL. L. Ray. 183. See also (1933) 33 Cot. L.
Rav. 1076.
34. And it would seem little more than an escape, since even the Income paid out
regularly under an annuity charged on the fund of a trust comes within the literal meaning
of the clause exempting to the trustee such income as is to be paid out regularly to the
beneficiaries, and since it is certainly intended that the income shall be so paid out by the
trustee, and it generally is so paid out. See relevant provision on the Revenue Act, supra
note 12.
35. See Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148, 150 (1931).
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by the recipient's income rather than that of the trust. But that there are
logical difficulties in treating this case like Irwin v. Gavit, cannot be denied.
Where the annual payments are not limited to income but are chargeable as
a matter of legal right on the fund as well, it is not as clear that only "income"
is given, when, if necessary, parts of the corpus may be appropriated to the
payment of the annuity. And if the beneficiary is taxed only when he is paid
out of income, there arises what the Supreme Court has considered the insur-
mountable incongruity 6 of taxing the beneficiary in some years and exempt-
ing him in others, according to the source of the payment. The validity of re-
garding even periodic payments of capital as taxable income to the beneficiary,
has been considerably weakened by Irwin v. Gavit where an important element
in the test of whether the payments to the beneficiary were taxable income
was whether they were income in the hands of the trustee. 7
But in spite of these logical difficulties the practical factors in favor of treat-
ing this case like Irwin v. Gavit might well have governed. Factually, the an-
nuity here involved accomplishes somewhat the same result as a gift of income.
And the logical difficulties are not insuperable since "income" is a loose termc?
and could have been regarded as including annuities.39 Moreover, in the rele-
vant sections of the Revenue Act at the time of Burnet v. Whitehouse, annui-
ties were specifically exempt to the purchaser to the extent of the consideration
which he had paid.40 In the fact that only this exemption appeared in the
Act could have been found an implicit intention that in all other cases annuities
were to be taxed to the annuitants. While the statute has been changed to
exempt from taxation all annuitants to the extent paid for the annuities by the
purchaser,4 ' the testamentary annuity of the type appearing in Burnet v. White-
house is not within the literal meaning of the exemption provisions because no
consideration is paid for it,- and annuities are even now exempt only up to the
consideration paid for them. And the testamentary annuity is not substantially
like those annuities to which exemptions have been granted by statutes, since
36. Id. at 151.
37. See Irwin v. Gavit, 26S U. S. 161, 167, 168 (1925).
38. One of the most confusing problems under modern income tax statutes is the
determination of just what is income. For discussions of the problem see HzwmTr, Tin
DEisox oF Iuco= AND Irs APPLIcATiON nT Frnm L TAXAT o:; (1925); Rottschaefer,
The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation (1929) 13 Mum. L. Rnv. 637; Stracham, T-
Differentiation of Capital and Income (1902) 18 LAw QuART. Rnv. 274; Stracham, Capftal
and Income under the Iniome Tax Acts (1913) 29 LAW Qv,%ru. REy. 163.
39. In England an annuity has been judically described as one "where an income i3
purchased with a sum of money, and the capital is gone and has ceased to exist, the principal
having been converted into an annuity." See Foley v. Fletcher, 3 H. & N. 779, 7M4-85
(1858).
40. U. S. Revenue Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 238 (1921), 26 U. S. C. A. § 954 (1926).
41. U. S. Revenue Act of 1932, § 22b (2), 47 Stat. 178 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp.
1934) § 3022 (b) (2).
42. The act provides that if amounts received under annuity contracts "exceed the
aggregate premiums or consideration paid, then the excess -hall be included in gros. income."
Note 41, supra. Logically, this exemption does not preclude taxation of the beneficiary of




purchased annuities contemplate a return to the annuitant of part of the con-
sideration, while generally no such intention prevails in annuities such as the
one in the Whitehouse case. If Burnet v. Whitehouse is not overruled by the
Supreme Court, it would seem that the foregoing considerations may warrant a
change in the result by statute.
With respect to the third group of cases, those involving purchased annuities,
the Revenue Act prior to 1926 provided that only purchasers of annuities them.
selves were exempt from paying taxes on the payments received under the an-
nuities, up to the value of the consideration paid.40 But, as has been pointed
out, a similar exemption has since been extended to all annuitants.41 While
the taxation of annuities is carefully covered by statute, there remains the prob-
lem of determining just what transactions may be considered annuities as
exempted under the Act. Certainly, since annuity contracts are referred to in
the same phrase and impliedly put in the same classification as insurance and
endowment contracts in the statute,43 regular commercial annuities purchased
from insurance companies come within the scope of the statutory exemptions.
The determination of the annuity status of a gift of property with a reservation
of the income therefrom, or a gift on condition that the donee pay to the donor
or a third person a stipulated sum each year, for a term of years, presents a
more difficult problem.
In the former case it would seem logically that the income should be taxed
to the donor. This type of transaction may be regarded as in effect a reserva-
tion by the donor of a life interest in the fund 4 4 the income of which, there.
fore, should be taxable to him. Or it may be said that by the transaction the
donee is made a trustee of the fund in favor of the donor for the designated
term,45 in which case the income should be taxable to the donor under the re-
sult reached in Irwin v. Gavit. Or, to use one of the arguments made in Irwin
v. Gavit, it may be said that since the payments to the donor under his re-
served right are income at their source, and it is income which is specifically
reserved, clearly, it is taxable income which the donor receives under his reser-
vation.46 Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Appeals has held the donor a pur-
chaser of an annuity and hence tax exempt on the income therefrom up to the
amount of the consideration paid. 47 Only the emotional appeal of the donor's
43. The Act provides for exemption on "Amounts received . . . under a life insurance,
endowment, or annuity contract .. 2
44. The Supreme Court used the same argument in Irwin v. Gavit in holding the
beneficiary of a testamentary trust taxable for the income accruing to him from the trust.
268 U. S. 161, 167 (1925).
45. This view of the conditional gift has been taken by judges in holding such trans.
actions valid transfers of property. See Flint v. Rathruff, 26 App. Div. 624, 625, 53 N, Y.
Supp. 206, 207 (1st Dep't 1918); concurring opinion of Smith, J., in In re Humphrey's
Estate, 191 App. Div. 291, 299-300, 181 N. Y. Supp. 169, 175 (1st Dep't 1920).
46. This, of course, is the reverse of the transaction in Irwn v. Gavit, where only the
income was given to the taxpayer, the corpus being reserved. But the fact that in one case
the income was granted and in the other it was reserved should not preclude the same
test to be applied to determine whether the sums in each case are taxable as "income"
under the Act.




generosity can account for this result. But the donor was enjoying the income
from the property during his life and thereby receiving as much benefit as if
he had retained the fund until his death before giving it to the donee. Hence
there seems to be no special equity in favor of exempting him.
In the case where a gift has been made on condition that the donee pay to
the donor or a third person a stipulated sum each year for a term of years, since
payments to be made to the donor or a third person are not merely charges on
the income of the property transferred, but are to be paid in any event by the
donee,48 the transaction more closely approaches the regular purchased annuity.
And the Department of Internal Revenue has treated this type of case as coming
within the purchased annuity category.49 But looking through the form of this
transaction to its substance, it cannot be denied that the purpose the donor
probably had in mind and the result which he obtained in this case is the same
as where the income from property is reserved, the specific payments required
of the donor usually amounting to less than or approximating the income from
the property transferred. Where such appears to be the case no distinction in
treatment should be accorded this type of transaction as against the one where
the donor reserves the income from the property granted away. But in the light
of Burnet v. Whitehouse the Court is not likely to submit to taxing the donor
on sums received from the donee where the latter is to pay a certain sum periodi-
cally irrespective of income.
In conclusion, it need hardly be pointed out that the past decisions of the
Supreme Court afford no definite rule or rules for the determination of the tax-
ability of sums received under rights to future periodic payments. If these
cases admit of any general conclusion, it is only that language will be liberally
construed and logic sacrificed to avoid the result of allowing some income to go
tax free, and to give effect to the intention of Congress to tax all earnings from
capital funds. But that the Court has not been quite so ready to depart from
logical niceties in order to effect equality in the treatment of taxpayers in sub-
stantially the same circumstances is evident by its departure from Irwin v.
Gavit in Burnet v. Whitehouse and analogous cases. A more liberal trend in
this direction seems desirable, however, in striking the balance between the
urgent expediency of obtaining funds for governmental needs, and the social
as well as political desirability of treating the taxpayers fairly.
48. The donee who accepts a gift is bound to execute the charges and obligations im-
posed on him by the terms of the gift in the same manner as the obligator in any ordinary
contract. Hurley v. Hurley, 146 La. 337, 83 So. 643 (1920); AFles v. Miles, 163 Ia. 153,
150 N. W. 21 (1914).
49. See I. T. 2397, VII-1 C-B. 90 (1928).
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